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CONSIDERING RELIGION AS A FACTOR IN FOSTER CARE
IN THE AFTERMATH OF EMPLOYMENT DIVISION,
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES V. SMITH AND
THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT
Thomas J. Cunningham*
I. INTRODUCTION
Most rights considered by Americans to be "fundamental" are
granted a special level of protection by the decisions of the
United States Supreme Court.' The standard is often described
as "strict scrutiny" or "compelling interest."2  Under this
standard of protection, a state must have more than just a good
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of the DePaul Institute For Church/State Studies, Professor Clifford Zimmerman, and
Jill A. Tivin for their assistance with the preparation of this article. All errors, omis-
sions, and outrageous remarks are the sole responsibility of the author.
1. For example, free speech (Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1926)
(Brandeis, J., concurring)); unreasonable searches and seizures (Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961)); and the right to a jury trial (Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968)) are all considered "fundamental" rights. See also THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN THE
MODERN STATE (Geoffrey R. Stone et al. eds., 1992).
2. The compelling interest test is ... the most exacting level of constitutional
scrutiny." Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CI. L.
REV. 115, 127 (1992) [hereinafter McConnell, Crossroads]. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466
U.S. 429, 432 (1984) ("[racial] classifications are subject to the most exacting scruti-
ny"); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 480 (1980) ("Congress may employ racial or
ethnic classifications ... only if [they] do not violate the equal protection compo-
nent"); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) ("any classification which
serves to penalize the exercise of [a constitutional] right, unless shown to be neces-
sary to promote a compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional") (emphasis
added). See also John H. Ely, Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92
HARV. L. REV. 5, 7-9 (1978) (comparing the use of strict scrutiny by the Warren and
Burger Courts).
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reason for writing legislation that encroaches upon its citizens'
fundamental rights.' Rather, the state must be able to prove a
"compelling" interest in achieving some desired result, a result
which necessitates the curtailment of fundamental rights.4 In
1990, however, the United States Supreme Court substantially
restricted a right from this list: the right to freely exercise one's
religion.5 The Court's decision, however, was subsequently se-
verely criticized.6  In response to the criticism, Congress
3. The "mere rationality" level of scrutiny inquires whether the statute, regula-
tion, or practice is rationally related to a legitimate state purpose. See In re San
Juan DuPont Plaza Hotel Fire Litigation, 687 F. Supp. 716, 734 (D.P.R. 1988)
("In ... respect [to the property right to sue], the Due Process Clause generally
protects citizens from arbitrary and capricious actions by the state.").
4. See Russell W. Galloway, Basic Free Exercise Clause Analysis, 29 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 865, 871-76 (1989) (outlining the goals and justifications required for
legislative action) [hereinafter Galloway, Basic Free Exercise].
5. See Employment Div., Dep't. of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990), rev'g 763 P.2d 146 (Or. 1988). The majority opinion describes the "compelling
interest" test as a "luxury." Id. at 888. This departure may not be unprecedented.
Professor McConnell has written that the mission of the Warren and Burger Courts
was to "protect democratic society from religion." McConnell, Crossroads, supra note 2,
at 120. According to McConnell, "[tihis set the Religion Clauses apart from the re-
mainder of the Bill of Rights, which protects various nongovernmental activities from
the power of democratic majorities." Id. See also DANIEL L. DREISBACH, REAL THREAT
AND MERE SHADow: RELIGIOuS LIBERTY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 159-64 (1987)
(mission of the Warren and Burger courts departs from historical context of the First
Amendment.
6. Robert N. Clinton, Peyote and Judicial Political Activism, 38 FED. B. NEWS &
J. 92 (decision fosters "neo-colonialist control of Indian affairs"); Michael W.
McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CIE. L. REV.
1109 (1990) (stating that Smith has little grounding in authority, and reduces status
of free exercise as a preferred freedom) [hereinafter McConnell, Free Exercise Revi-
sionism]; Gloria L. Buxbaum, Note, Ingestion of Illegal Drugs for Religious Purposes is
not Protected by the Constitution- Employment Division, Department of Human Re-
sources v. Smith, 21 SETON HALL L. REV. 111 (1990) (stating that decision "curtail[s]"
constitutional protection); Vance M. Croney, Note, Secondary Right: Protection of the
Free Exercise Clause Reduced by Oregon v. Smith, 27 WILLAMErrE L. REV. 173
(1991); Danielle A. Hess, Note, The Undoing of Mandatory Free Exercise Accommo-
dation-Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 66 WASH.
L. REV. 587 (1991) (explaining that Smith does not "guarantee that religion exemp-
tions will be granted when a practice is burdened"); Sara A. Juster, Note, Free Exer-
cise-or the Lack Thereof? Employment Division v. Smith, 24 CREIGHToN L. REV. 239
(1990) (Smith is the latest in line of decisions "chilling . . . the free exercise" of "mi-
nority . . . religions."); Eddie Lam, Note, Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources of Oregon v. Smith: The Limits of the Free Exercise Clause, 16 T. MAR-
SHALL L. REV. 377 (1991); David Leventhal, Note, The Free Exercise Clause Gets A
Costly Workout in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon
v. Smith, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 163 (1990) (explaining that criminal laws burden free
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recently passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA),7 which returns the application of the compelling inter-
est test to free exercise jurisprudence. This article will explore
the impact of the decision in Employment Division Department
of Human Resources ,v. Smith8 upon a discrete group of citi-
zens: foster children. The analysis requires an examination of
the problems inherent in protecting a child's right to free ex-
ercise in a foster care system, and whether in fact a child does
have a protected right to freely exercise his or her religion.9
The article will consider the rights of the parents, and how
exercise the most but are reviewed with the least scrutiny); Sandra A. Pochop, Note,
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith: Religious
Peyotism and the 'Purposeful" Erosion of Free Exercise Protections, 36 S.D. L. REV.
358 (1991) (decision encourages encroachment of religious freedom by state); Tom C.
Rawlings, Note, Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith: The
Supreme Court Deserts the Free Exercise Clause, 25 GA. L. REv. 567 (1991) (stating
that the Court fails in its role of checking abuses by legislators); Steve Rosenstein,
Note, Employment Div. v. Smith: Sacramental Peyote Use and Free Exercise Analy-
sis-Vision Wanted, 22 U. WEST L-.A L. REV. 185 (1991) (decision hostile to minority
religions); Janet V. Rugg & Andria A. Simone, Note, The Free Exercise Clause: Em-
ployment Division v. Smith's Inexplicable Departure From the Strict Scrutiny Stan-
dard, 6 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 117 (1990); Diana D. Stithem, Note, The
"Hollow Promise" of the Free Exercise Clause: Denying the Right of Peyote Use in the
Native American Church, 26 LAND & WATER L. REV. 323 (1991); Harry F. Tepker,
Jr., Hallucinations of Neutrality in the Oregon Peyote Case, 16 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1
(1991) (stating that the Court goes beyond Constitution to diminish free exercise
analysis demanded by First Amendment); Maximilian B. Torres, Note, Free Exercise of
Religion: Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 14 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 282 (1991); Cause for Concern on Religious Liberty, Cm. TRIB.,
Sept. 8, 1992, at 24 (decision may force "smaller sects ... to give up practices that
pose no danger to anyone else"); Stephen Chapman, Restoring the True Meaning of
Religious Freedom, CH. TRIB., Apr. 16, 1992, at 27. (decision "shrink[s] ... constitu-
tional guarantees"); Repulsing a Threat to Religious Liberty, CI. TRIB., Mar. 23,
1992, at 10 (decision "revers[es] ... constitutional doctrine"). But see William P.
Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. Cmi. L. REV. 308
(1991) (responding to McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism); Ellis West, The Case
Against A Right To Religion-Based Exemptions, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POiV 591 (1990); Bruce Fein, Perils of the RFRA Remedy, WASH. TImEs, Sept. 24,
1992, at G1 ("[I1n practice, the compelling interest standard has proven utterly idio-
syncratic in application."); Bruce Fein, Dubious Defense of Faith?, WASH. TIMES, Apr.
23, 1991, at GI ("decision should be laudable to those who prefer a secular to a theo-
cratic state").
7. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L . No. 103-141, 107 Stat.
1488 (1993) [hereinafter RFRA].
8. 494 U.S. 872 (1990), revg 763 P.2d 146 (Or. 1988).
9. See infra notes 147-93 and accompanying text.
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parental rights have been impacted by Smith." Finally, the
article will consider the possible arguments of states that prefer
not to consider religion in making foster care placements."
States may argue that the interests of children and parents in
the foster care systems must be infringed upon for some greater
good.' 2
The central thesis of the article asserts that Smith did not
affect the test by which a court would consider a challenge by
foster care children or their parents of a state's refusal to con-
sider religion in the placement process. Thus, these cases will
continue to be analyzed in the same manner regardless of the
impact of Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.
Parental issues and free exercise claims create what Justice
Scalia describes as a "hybrid" analysis in the Smith opinion and
are therefore factually different than Smith which mostly dealt
with free exercise claims." Further, under either the "compel-
ling interest" or Smith test, states' arguments in not consid-
ering religion as a factor in foster care placements are unper-
suasive at best, and specious at worst. This article concludes
that religion must be considered as one factor in the placement
process, if requested by the parents or the child.
In Plato's "Ideal Commonwealth," all children were to be
commonly raised, and no parent was to know his or her own
child.'4 Children were to be raised in the sterile environment
of the State, in a regimented fashion.6 The Supreme Court
wrote in Meyer v. Nebraska that this type of legislative
standardization cannot be imposed upon "the people of a State
without doing violence to both letter and spirit of the Constitu-
tion." 6 However, with the advent of Smith, the Supreme Court
10. See infra notes 194-232 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 233-54 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 255-302 and accompanying text.
13. 494 U.S. at 882.
14. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923).
15. Id. at 402.
16. Id. See also Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (Aristotlean and Spar-
tan models of collectivization of youth rejected as contrary to American tradition and
freedoms); Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1135-36 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (stating
notion that the best interest of a child may be bureaucratically controlled is rejected
as repugnant to American traditions).
[Vol. 28:53
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radically changed the test by which cases involving free exercise
were to be analyzed. The change of analysis could have affected
foster care systems in the United States and the ability of
parents and children to freely exercise their religious beliefs
within that system. Indeed, if the Smith opinion had reduced
the scrutiny level by which the free exercise challenges to the
practices of foster care are analyzed, then it invites states to
move toward "standardization" of children in foster care
systems.
The goal of this article is to consider the potential impact of
the Smith opinion on the rights of foster care children and
their parents, as well as the consequences of the RFRA. Follow-
ing the Smith opinion, a great number of commentators predict-
ed the end of traditional free exercise protection by the
Supreme Court.'7 In response, Congress passed the RFRA,
which is designed to replace the compelling interest test dis-
carded by the Court in Smith."5 This article will point out that
the RFRA will not affect the analysis applicable to the free
exercise concerns of foster care children and their parents.
Rather, even under the now defunct Smith opinion, these ques-
tions are of such character that the compelling interest test
would have still been required. This article takes the position
that few, if any, state interests will rise to a level sufficient to
deny children and their parents the opportunity to have religion
considered as a factor in the placement process.
II. EMPLOYMENT DIsIoN, DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN
RESOURCES V. SMITH
Until 1990, no legislature could pass a law that would pro-
hibit the free exercise of religion" without a compelling reason
for doing so." The test, which is often referred to as the "coin-
17. Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 Sup. CT. REV. 1 [here-
inafter, Laycock, Remnants]; McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism, supra note 6, at
1111. See also sources cited supra note 6.
18. See RFRA, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993).
19. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
20. See e.g. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981) (the Jehovah's Wit-
nesses); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626-29 (1978) (plurality opinion) (the Baptist
Church); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (the Amish); Sherbert v.
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pelling interest" test, was severely narrowed by the Supreme
Court's opinion in Smith.2'
A. Background and Facts of Smith
The interesting and important circumstances giving rise to
the Smith opinion aid in understanding how and why the Court
drafted the opinion. In the early 1980s, Alfred Smith and Galen
Black were members of the Native American Church.' The
Native American Church considers the ingestion of peyote to be
a sacrament "similar to the drinking of wine in Christian com-
munion services. " '3 Because of the sectarian nature of the use
of the drug, many states have exempted the use of peyote by
church members in bona fide religious ceremonies from the
states' lists of controlled substances. 2' Oregon, the state in
which Smith and Black used peyote, has not made such an
exemption.25
Smith and Black, ironically, were counselors at the Douglas
County Council on Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention and
Treatment." Obviously, such an organization has firm policies
regarding drug use by its employees. When it was discovered
that Smith and Black ingested peyote at religious services, they
were terminated.' They were subsequently denied unemploy-
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) (the Seventh-day Adventist Church).
21. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990),
rev'g 763 P.2d 146 (Or. 1988).
22. Id. at 874.
23. Pochop, supra note 6, at 358. Peyote is a cactus that grows wild in the south-
western United States. "Buttons" of peyote are either chewed or are made into tea.
Id at 358 n.3 (citing People v. Woody, 394 P.2d 813, 816 (Cal. 1964)). Peyote used in
such a fashion acts as a hallucinogenic drug and is listed as a controlled substance
in several jurisdictions. Id at 358 nn.5-6.
24. Id. at 359 & n.8. ("On March 25, 1991, the Idaho legislature passed a bill
legalizing the religious use of peyote by members of the Native American
Church .... Idaho [became] the twenty-fourth state to legitimate its use.") (citation
omitted). The federal government has also made such use of peyote legal. 21 C.F.R. §
1307.31 (1990).
25. Pochop, supra note 6, at 359 n.9.
26. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660, 662
(1988), on remand, 763 P.2d 146 (Or. 1988), rev'd, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
27. Smith, 485 U.S. at 662 & nn.2-3.
28. Id. at 661-62.
[Vol. 28:53
RELIGION AND FOSTER CARE
ment benefits, and they claimed this denial violated their right
to freely exercise their religion."
The Oregon Court of Appeals agreed with Smith and
Black,"0  and their decision was affirmed by the Oregon
Supreme Court.31 The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari 2 and remanded to the Oregon Supreme Court for
determination by that court whether the sacramental use of
peyote violated Oregon law.33 The Oregon Supreme Court re-
sponded that such use was in fact illegal,34 and the United
States Supreme Court once again granted certiorari. 5
In the majority opinion written by Justice Scalia, the Court
fundamentally changed the way it analyzes free exercise chal-
lenges. Scalia wrote that a state did not need to justify a law
that burdened religious practice by proving a compelling inter-
est.36 Rather, he said that an individual was required to re-
spect a "valid and neutral law of general applicability" 7 even
if that law "proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion
prescribes (or proscribes)."" As will be discussed further, this
holding was a departure from earlier decisions, and fundamen-
tally changed the manner in which courts would determine
what is protected under the Free Exercise Clause.
29. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874
(1990), rev'g 763 P.2d 146 (Or. 1988).
30. Smith v. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources, 709 P.2d 246 (Or.
App. 1985).
31. Smith v. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources, 721 P.2d 445, 449-50
(Or. 1986) (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)); Thomas v. Review Bd.,
450 U.S. 707 (1981).
32. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 480 U.S. 916 (1987).
33. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660, 673
(1988) ("[B]ecause we are uncertain about the legality of the religious use of peyote
in Oregon, it is not now appropriate for us to decide whether the practice is [consti-
tutionally] protected").
34. Smith v. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources, 763 P.2d 146, 148 (Or.
1988), rev'd, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
35. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 489 U.S. 1077 (1989).
36. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879
(1990).
37. Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982)
(Stevens, J., concurring)).
38. Id.
1993]
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B. The Importance and Impact of the Smith Opinion
The Smith holding was surprising, given the Court's prior
decisions in cases like Sherbert v. Verner 9 and Thomas v.
Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Division,4 "
where the Court held that laws impacting religious beliefs or
practices needed to be sustained by some compelling interest.
These cases did not involve questions of "general applicability"
or "neutrality." Not only was this holding surprising coming
from the Court, but it was particularly surprising that its au-
thor was Justice Scalia. Consider Justice Scalia's statement in
1989:
In such cases as Sherbert v. Verner, Wisconsin v.
Yoder, Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment
Security Div., and Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals
Comm'n of Fla., we held that the Free Exercise Clause
of the First Amendment required religious beliefs to be
accommodated by granting religion-specific exemptions
from otherwise applicable laws.4'
Now consider Justice Scalia in 1990, writing for the Court in
Smith: "We have never held that an individual's religious be-
liefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law
prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate."42 Thus,
Smith was a departure not only from previous decisions of the
Court, but also seemed to contradict the prior writings of
Scalia.4
39. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
40. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
41. Laycock, Remnants, supra note 17, at 3 (quoting Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bull-
ock, 489 U.S. 1, 38 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) (citations
omitted)).
42. Id. (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-79).
43. Because of this wide departure from accepted First Amendment jurisprudence,
the Smith opinion has been widely discussed and criticized. See Andrew W. Austin,
Faith and the Constitutional Definition of Religion, 22 CUMB. L. REV. 1 (1991-1992)
(decision alters free exercise analysis but offers no definition of religion); Donald R.
Frederico, Note, Constitutional Law-Free Exercise of Religion, 76 MASS. L. REV. 161
(1991); Galloway, Basic Free Exercise supra note 4; James D. Gordon, III, Free Exer-
cise on the Mountaintop, 79 CAL. L. REv. 91 (1991); McConnell, Free Exercise Revi-
[Vol. 28:53
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Justice Scalia might respond that there is no contradiction
between his statements in Bullock and Smith. In Bullock he
refers to beliefs, while in Smith he refers to conduct. But this
distinction is disingenuous, as no pure belief can ever be regu-
lated. Only conduct may be regulated. In fact, Scalia seems to
recognize as much, writing in Smith: "the 'exercise of religion'
often involves not only belief and profession but the
performance of (or abstention from) physical acts .... "" Nev-
ertheless, according to Scalia, so long as the law is not intended
to burden religion, the "compelling interest" test may not be
applicable.45
The Court did not leave the "compelling interest" test behind
entirely. Rather, they salvaged it in at least three specific situa-
tions. If the law in question was "non-neutral,"46 was not "gen-
erally applicable,"47 or if it impacted what Scalia described as
a "hybrid" constitutional right," it would still be tested by the
tried and true "compelling interest" or "strict scrutiny" test. The
Court also retained the "compelling interest" test in cases
where the statute in question provided for a system of individu-
alized exemptions.49 Free exercise, under Smith, was the only
individual constitutional right that was to be tested by a less
searching inquiry than strict scrutiny."
sionism, supra note 6; Laycock, Remnants, supra note 17.
It is not my purpose to either justify the Court's opinion nor criticize it, but
merely to accept it, and to analyze the effect it might have had upon the foster care
system.
44. Smith, 494 U.S. at 877.
45. Id. at 879.
46. Id. See also infra notes 52-65 and accompanying text.
47. Id. See also infra notes 52-65 and accompanying text.
48. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881. See also infra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
49. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884.
50. See sources cited supra note 6. Indeed, even rights not specifically enumerated
in the Constitution, such as the right to marital privacy, received a higher level of
protection than free exercise under Smith. Compare Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965) (holding that a statute which forbade the use of contraceptives violated
the marital right of privacy) with Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). This is especially curious given the central role freedom
of religion played in the founding fathers' decision to seek independence. See IRVING
BRANT, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ITS ORIGIN & MEANING 66-67 (1965); JAMES MADISON
ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (Robert S. Alley ed., 1985); HuGo L. BLAcK, The Bill of Rights
1993]
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C. Neutrality, Hybrid Claims, and Systems of Exemption
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in Smith, explicitly
stated that the first amendment "has not been offended" if
prohibiting free exercise is "merely the incidental effect of a
generally applicable and otherwise valid provision."5 But if a
statute, or presumably a state practice, were not neutral or
generally applicable, the "compelling interest" test would apply.
Similarly, according to the Court, if a challenge involved a
"hybrid" claim, that is, if more than one constitutional right
were impacted by a single statute or practice, the "compelling
interest" test would apply. Finally, the Court wrote that if the
state provides for a system of individualized exemptions from
the statute or practice in issue, the "compelling interest" test
remains applicable.
1. Neutrality and General Applicability
As mentioned above, the Court did not completely eliminate
the compelling interest test. If a statute or practice is not neu-
tral or is not generally applicable, the compelling interest test
should be applied. The problem is that the terms "neutral" and
"generally applicable" are not defined in the Smith opinion.
This certainly is not the first time that the Court has stated
that a statute should be neutral with regard to religion,
although usually the issue of neutrality is seen in Establish-
ment Clause cases.52 Professor McConnell has stated that if
neutrality is properly defined, it will often be at odds with
"religious neutrality."53 Professor Laycock, however, disagrees
with McConnell.'
and the Federal Government, in THE GREAT RIGHTS 46-49 (1964).
51. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878.
52. See, e.g., Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh
Chapter, 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3098-101 (1989). Other cases are collected in Douglas Lay-
cock, Equal Access and Moments of Silence: The Equal Status of Religious Speech by
Private Speakers, 81 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 2 n.6 (1986). Commentators' works are collect-
ed in Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment
Neutrality and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266, 314 n.183 (1987).
53. See Michael W. McConnell, Neutrality Under the Religion Clauses, 81 NW. U.
L. REV. 146, 149 n.17 (1986) [hereinafter McConnell, Neutrality].
54. Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and as Aggregated Neutrality Toward
[Vol. 28:53
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Laycock says "[wihen I say government should be neutral
towards religion, I mean to include the claim that it should not
express an opinion about religion."" But it may be that a gov-
ernment can pass a statute with the intention of burdening
religion, or at least clearly directed at restricting religious liber-
ty, and not explicitly state an opinion about religion.
It is this realization that gives rise to the categories of "sub-
stantive" versus "formal" neutrality. Philip Kurland provides
the best definition of "formal" neutrality:
The [Free Exercise and Establishment] clauses should be
read as stating a single precept: that government cannot
utilize religion as a standard for action or inaction because
these clauses, read together as they should be, prohibit
classification in terms of religion either to confer a benefit
or to impose a burden."
Commentators have rejected formal neutrality as a valid test.5 7
In Smith, however, the Court seems to have adopted formal
neutrality. The Court said that the government could regulate
Mass for a good reason, for a bad reason, or for no reason at
all, so long as the regulation was facially neutral and did not
single out religion.58
Despite its apparent adoption in Smith, there can be virtual-
ly no doubt that previously the Court did not favor formal neu-
trality. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, for example, the Court said "[A]
regulation neutral on its face may, in its application, nonethe-
less offend the constitutional requirement for governmental neu-
trality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion."59 In
his dissent in Sherbert v. Verner, Justice Harlan wrote:
Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993, 995 (1990) [hereinafter Laycock, Neutrality].
55. Id. at 997.
56. Philip Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHm. L.
REV. 1, 96 (1961).
57. See Philip B. Kurland, The Irrelevance of the Constitution: The Religion Claus-
es of the First Amendment and the Supreme Court, 24 ViL. L. REV. 3, 24 (1978). But
see Mark Tushnet, "Of Church and State and the Supreme Court": Kurland Revisited,
1989 Sup. CT. REv. 373 (1989).
58. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990).
59. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1971) (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398 (1963)).
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The constitutional obligation of "neutrality"... is not so
narrow a channel that the slightest deviation from an abso-
lutely straight course leads to condemnation. There are too
many instances in which no such course can be charted, too
many areas in which the pervasive activities of the State
justify some special provision for religion to prevent it from
being submerged by an all-embracing secularism.'
Professor Laycock makes two observations about the adoption
of formal neutrality. First, he states that if formal neutrality
were the policy adopted by the Court, the National Prohibition
Act's exemption for the use of sacramental wine would have
been unconstitutional.6 Second, he states that any aid given
to secular private schools would also have to be given to reli-
gious schools on exactly the same terms.62
The second type of neutrality is known as "substantive neu-
trality." Laycock defines substantive neutrality as follows:
"[Tihe religion clauses require government to minimize the
extent to which it either encourages or discourages religious
belief or disbelief, practice or nonpractice, observance or nonob-
servance."63 Substantive neutrality seems to be more in keep-
ing with our tradition of religious liberty, in that it leaves the
choice of religion up to the individual." This choice is left as
private as possible, with no interference by the government,
either encouraging or discouraging.65 Despite the appeal of
substantive neutrality, it appears for the moment to have been
rejected by the Supreme Court in favor of formal neutrality.
Thus, if a statute or practice under which foster care children
or their parents were denied the opportunity to express reli-
gious preferences in placement was formally non-neutral the
compelling interest test would apply. Such a regulation would
have to explicitly state that religion will not be considered as a
60. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 422 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
61. Laycock, Neutrality, supra note 54, at 1000 (citing An Act to Prohibit Intoxi-
cating Beverages, ch. 85 § 6, 41 Stat. 305, 311 (1919)).
62. Id. at 1001.
63. Id.
64. See Philip B. Kurland, The Origins of the Religion Clauses of the Constitution,
27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 839 (1986) [hereinafter Kurland, Origins].
65. Laycock, Neutrality, supra note 54, at 1003.
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factor in the placement process. Such an explicit denial of the
opportunity to express religious preference would be non-neu-
tral, in that it would explicitly denigrate religion-religious
belief would be openly and specifically discouraged.
General applicability is more difficult to analyze than neu-
trality. Is a regulation that affects only those within the foster
care system generally applicable? Or 'would the statute be con-
sidered "generally applicable" if it applied only to those without
religious beliefs? One might assume that the former would be
considered "generally applicable" while the latter would not.
Neither the Court nor the commentators provide any guidance
on this issue. Perhaps "generally applicable" is meant not as a
separate issue from neutrality, but rather as a part of neutrali-
ty. In other words, if a statute is not formally neutral because
it specifically targets religion, it is not generally applicable as it
only applies to people with religious beliefs.
2. Hybrid Claims
In Smith, one gets the impression that the Court would have
liked to simply do away with the "compelling interest" test for
free exercise challenges entirely. But this would have been too
bold a move. Facing an onslaught of stare decisis, the Court
relented that "[t]he only decisions in which we have held that
the First Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally
applicable law to religiously motivated action have involved not
the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in
conjunction with other constitutional protections."66 Thus, the
Court stated that when faced with such a "hybrid" challenge,
courts should continue to apply the "compelling interest" test.67
In a foster care setting, many interests are combined. As this
article will later demonstrate, parents have a right to free exer-
cise, a right to direct the upbringing of their children, and a
right to affect their children's religious training." Whether
these are three separate rights, or simply one right broken into
66. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
67. Id. at 882.
68. See infra notes 194-219 and accompanying text.
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three parts, is unclear. Children also have free exercise
rights.69 However, the degree of constitutional protection of
these rights remains unclear. Finally, foster care parents also
have free exercise rights.70 Thus, the denial of the opportunity
to express a religious preference in a foster care setting would
impact the rights of many different parties. This appears to be
a good example of a "hybrid" situation in which the Court
would apply the compelling interest test.
Indeed, the Court used free exercise rights and parental
rights to direct a child's upbringing as a paradigm for a "hy-
brid" right deserving protection of the compelling interest test.
The only decisions in which we have held that the First
Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally appli-
cable law to religiously motivated action have involved not
the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise
Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections,
such as . . . the right of parents, acknowledged in Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), to direct the educa-
tion of their children.7
This is perhaps the strongest argument for the proposition that
even under Smith, a denial of the opportunity to express reli-
gious preference in foster care placements must be tested by
the compelling interest standard. Clearly, both the free exercise
rights and the parents' right to direct the education of their
children are impacted in making foster care placements; thus, a
burden on such rights would be analyzed under the compelling
interest test.
3. A System of Individualized Exemptions
The final attribute of a regulation that will engage the "com-
pelling interest" test is a provision for individualized exemp-
tions.72 For example, if in the Smith case the Oregon statute
which prohibited the ingestion of peyote had provided that
69. See infra notes 147-93 and accompanying text.
70. See infra notes 213-32 and accompanying text.
71. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)).
72. Id. at 884.
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individuals would be exempt if they obtained a doctor's
certification of their medicinal need for the drug, the statute
would provide for a system of individualized exemptions. The
thought here is that if the statute provides exemptions for cer-
tain reasons, such as medical treatment, then it should provide
similar exemptions for religious purposes, unless the state can
show an overriding compelling interest.
In the foster care system, many individualized considerations
are made when placing a child. These considerations include
factors such as age, gender, race, location of natural family, and
special health needs. While these may not be considered "ex-
emptions" from any generalized statute, the argument can be
made that if the state considers each of these factors, it should
not be allowed to deny similar consideration of religion without
showing a compelling interest.
D. The Impact of Smith: "If your religious belief is burdened by
this, too bad."73
The Smith decision significantly impacted religious issues in
the United States. For example, the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration canceled an exemption from wearing
hard hats previously granted to Old Order Amish construction
workers; Quaker organizations were ordered to collect taxes
from employees who refused to pay such taxes because of reli-
gious opposition to war; and a federal trial court's pre-Smith
decision ordering state prison officials not to serve Muslim
inmates pork was remanded for a new trial.74
Commentators have imagined other possible consequences as
well. Under Smith, the use of sacramental wine by minors
could constitutionally be banned;75 school dress codes might
prevent the wearing of religious garments such as turbans and
73. See Crier & Company (CNN television broadcast, June 26, 1992) (Nadine
Strossen, President of the American Civil Liberties Union, commenting on the essence
of Smith).
74. William D. Siegel, High Court Erodes Religious Rights, But Congress Has
Legislation That Can End The Threat, NEWSDAY, Apr. 16, 1992, at 113.
75. Id.
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yarmulkes;76 public schools might be barred from allowing un-
excused absences on religious holidays;77 anti-discrimination
statutes might be held to cover churches, requiring them to
ordain female and homosexual clergy;78 parochial schools could
be forced to distribute condoms;79 religious hospitals could be
forced to perform abortions, 0 and religious sermons on issues
of political significance could lead to the revocation of tax
exemptions.8
In response to this parade of horribles, another commentator
lauded the development of Smith, and countered the list with
one of his own:
Contemplate the ramifications of a contrary ruling [to
Smith]. Christian Science parents could with impunity
cause the deaths of fetuses or infants by refusing to autho-
rize blood transfusions or other medical treatment because
they are contrary to religious creed. Jehovah's Witnesses
could employ children as religious proselytizers in contra-
vention of child labor laws, with no penalty. Muslims could
marry four women, commit rape unwitnessed by four per-
sons and cease government employment to make a pilgrim-
age to Mecca without adverse consequences. Physicians
acting from religious scruples would be authorized to ignore
state laws requiring that abortion referral information be
offered to health-endangered mothers.82
Notwithstanding these examples of the consequences of a hold-
ing contrary to Smith, most commentary has been critical of the
opinion."
Since the Smith opinion was handed down, two interesting
events have transpired. First, a survey of state and federal
cases involving free exercise claims reveals that many judges
76. Id.; see McConnell, Crossroads, supra note 2, at 138.
77. Siegel, supra note 74, at 113.
78. Id.; see McConnell, Crossroads, supra note 2, at 138.
79. Siegel, supra note 74, at 113.
80. Id.; see McConnell, Crossroads, supra note 2, at 138.
81. See McConnell, Crossroads, supra note 2, at 138.
82. Bruce Fein, Dubious Defense of Faith?, WASH. TIMEs, Apr. 23, 1991, at G1.
83. See sources cited supra note 6.
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are reluctant to follow the new analysis.' Second, the opinion
has resulted in a legislative return to the "compelling interest"
test."'
1. Judicial Resistance to Smith
An interesting phenomenon developed after the Smith deci-
sion. Some state and lower federal courts demonstrated a reluc-
tance to apply the test enunciated in Smith. Perhaps the best
example of this is the District Court of Rhode Island case of
Yang v. Sturner.86 In that case, the plaintiffs twenty-three-
year-old son had suffered a seizure while sleeping. He was
rushed to the hospital, but died two days later. Since doctors
were unable to determine the cause of either the seizure or the
death, an autopsy was performed pursuant to state law,87 but
without the permission or knowledge of the man's parents.
The young man and his parents were members of the Hmong
community, whose deeply held religious convictions prohibited
any mutilation of the body, including autopsies or the removal
of organs. They challenged the state statute which provided forimmediate autopsies without knowledge or permission by the
family, claiming that it violated their free exercise rights.
Applying the analytical framework contained in Wisconsin v.
Yoder' and Sherbert v. Verner,89 the court held that the in-
terests of the state in this case "fall far short of being compel-
ling." 90 As a result, the court concluded that the state had vio-
lated the Yangs' religious beliefs which are protected under the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. This decision
was reached just three months before the United States Su-
preme Court announced the opinion in the Smith case on April
17, 1990. The Yang court had to take the newly released Smith
84. See infra notes 86-120 and accompanying text.
85. See infra notes 121-30 and accompanying text.
86. 728 F. Supp. 845 (D.R.I. 1990), vacated in part, 750 F. Supp. 558 (D.R.I.
1990).
87. R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-4-4 (1992).
88. 406 U.S. 205, 219 (1972).
89. 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963).
90. Yang, 728 F. Supp. at 856.
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case into its consideration when the court considered the issue
of damages later in November of 1990.
On November 9, 1990, the judge in Yang vacated that part of
his earlier opinion which found a violation of the plaintiffs'
protected First Amendment rights. 1 "It is with deep regret
that I have determined that the Employment Division case
mandates that I recall my prior opinion. "" The judge was
clearly displeased with the Smith opinion, and for a lower fed-
eral court judge, was uncharacteristically critical of the Court's
decision. "While I feel constrained to apply the majority's opin-
ion to the instant case, I cannot do this without expressing my
profound regret and my own agreement with Justice
Blackmun's forceful dissent."" The judge concluded by rhetori-
cally asking: "what is left of Free Exercise jurisprudence when
one can attack only laws explicitly aimed at a religious
group?"
94
Although the judge in Yang felt constrained by Smith, other
courts have clearly not felt so constrained. In Zobrest v.
Catalina Foothills School District," the Ninth Circuit consid-
ered whether the denial of a state funded sign language inter-
preter for a deaf student enrolled in a private religious school
violated the student's free exercise rights. The court stated that
the imposition of a burden on an individual's right to free exer-
cise must be justified by some compelling state interest.96 The
court did not mention or cite Smith. The court held that the
state did show a compelling interest in wanting to avoid a
conflict with the Establishment Clause. 7 The dissenting judge
found that the state's concern about the Establishment Clause
was not warranted, and thus did not justify the burden being
placed upon the student's right to freely exercise his religion.
91. Yang v. Sturner, 750 F. Supp. 558 (1990).
92. Id. at 558.
93. Id. at 559.
94. Id.
95. 963 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir. 1992).
96. Id. at 1196 (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963)).
97. Id. at 1197. This Establishment Clause versus Free Exercise Clause debate is
discussed with regard to foster care in Part III. See infra notes 266-302 and accompa-
nying text.
98. Id. at 1205.
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The dissenting judge also did not mention or cite Smith.
The significance of the Zobrest opinion is that the Ninth
Circuit, in a case two years after the Smith decision, did not
feel that it was necessary to consider whether the applicable
statute9 was neutral, generally applicable, or provided a sys-
tem of exemptions pursuant to the guidelines presented in
Smith. °0 This was a federal case, based upon a federal consti-
tutional issue, and yet the court declined to apply the analytical
framework provided by the United States Supreme Court only
two years earlier.
In Niebla v. County of San Diego,'°' the Ninth Circuit con-
sidered whether the State of California could legitimately force
a Jehovah's Witness to receive a blood transfusion. In this case,
a county social worker obtained an emergency transfusion order
because a fifteen-year-old girl and her parents refused to allow
blood transfusions based on their religious beliefs. As in the
Zobrest case, the court was able to neatly skirt the application
of Smith by merely finding a compelling interest, without dis-
cussing the question of whether such a high interest was re-
quired. In Niebla, the court held that "[firee exercise of religion,
bodily autonomy and parental rights yield before the compelling
interest the state has in protecting children from serious health
problems."' 2 By finding a compelling interest, the court was
able to decide the case without considering the proper test.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals had to decide a more
difficult case. In United States v. Boyll,' °3 the court was faced
with a case very much like Smith. Only in this case, the
defendant was prosecuted under federal law,0 4 rather than
99. The Federal Education of the Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(1) (1975).
100. The Eighth Circuit decided a free exercise case in 1992, and failed to consider
or apply the Smith precedent in that case as did the Ninth Circuit in Zobrest. See
Bear v. Nix, 977 F.2d 1291 (8th Cir. 1992) (denying inmate who wished to practice
Native American Religion the opportunity to do so based upon the analytical
framework of OLone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987)).
101. No. 90-56302, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 15049 (9th Cir. June 23, 1992).
102. Id. at *11 (citing Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp., 278 F. Supp.
488, 504-05 (W.D. Wash. 1967), affd, 390 U.S. 598 (1968); LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMIE-
RICAN CONSTrUTIONAL LAw 1363 (2d ed. 1988)).
103. No. 91-2235, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 14537 (10th Cir. June 16, 1992).
104. See 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) (1988 & Supp. II 1990); 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 (1992).
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state law. Under federal law, the possession of peyote by a
member of the Native American Church was exempted from the
standard law regarding possession of a controlled substance. °5
However, Boyll was not a Native American.
The case presented the question of whether the government
could require a person to be a Native American in order to
obtain the religious exemption provided in the statute. The
Tenth Circuit quoted at length from the trial court decision in
finding that the government's interpretation of the statute was
improper. The lower court had stated:
Since the use of peyote by Native American Church mem-
bers is the very essence of their religious beliefs, the pro-
posed racially restrictive reading of 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31
would have the sure effect of imposing a racial exclusion to
membership in the Native American Church itself. To ex-
clude individuals of a particular race from being members
of a recognized religious faith is offensive to the very heart
of the First Amendment.'
Smith is nowhere to be found in the Boyll opinion.
Admittedly, none of the above cases involved pure free exer-
cise issues. They allowed the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits
to decide the issues that were presented without discussing
Smith. In Zobrest and Niebla, it was simple for the court to
merely hold that the State had a compelling interest, and
therefore regardless of which test applied, the burden to free
exercise was justified. The Boyll court had the toughest time
avoiding Smith, mainly because its facts were so similar to
Smith. Despite the similarities the court was apparently uncom-
fortable with Smith, and therefore unwilling to apply it.
It is undeniable that Smith was unpopular with the courts
and commentators. 7 In some cases, it was possible for a
court to avoid Smith by simply characterizing the issue as a
state, rather than a federal, constitutional issue."8 Here, the
105. See 21 U.S.C. § 812(c).
106. United States v. Boyll, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 14537, at *9 (10th Cir. June
16, 1992) (citing Waltz v. Tax Conm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970)).
107. See sources cited supra note 6.
108. See Minnesota v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990); see also Tony
[Vol. 28:53
RELIGION AND FOSTER CARE
state courts fashioned whatever analytical framework they
chose.
In Donahue v. Fair Employment and Housing Com-
mission,10 9 a landlord defended his refusal to rent an apart-
ment to an unmarried couple on First Amendment grounds.
The court noted the development of First Amendment law in
Smith, but refused to apply the new Smith analysis. The court
reasoned that although the defense was based on a federal
constitutional right, it was also based upon independent state
constitutional grounds. The court felt that although Smith was
now the federal standard, their own state free exercise test re-
mained the "balancing test and compelling state interest
analysis."1
10
A similar issue was presented before the Maine Supreme
Court in Rupert v. City of Portland."' This was another case
involving the Native American Church. In Rupert, the plaintiff
was arrested for possession of a small quantity of marijuana
and a marijuana pipe. The charges were dismissed when the
arresting officer failed to appear at a preliminary hearing. The
plaintiff subsequently sought the return of his pipe. The police
department informed the plaintiff that as drug paraphernalia
the pipe was subject to confiscation under the Maine Drug
Paraphernalia Act."'
The plaintiff sued for the return of his pipe, arguing that he
used marijuana only for religious purposes and therefore, his
use of the pipe was protected by the Free Exercise Clause of
both the state and federal constitutions."' The court noted
Maruo, Congress Joins Fight on Religious Limits, USA TODAY, Apr. 17, 1991, at 1A
(discussing the Minnesota Amish case).
109. 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32 (Cal. App. 1991).
110. Id. at 42 (citing Auto Equity Sales v. Superior Court, 369 P.2d 937 (Cal.
1962)). The dissenting judge felt that before a court applied a different state standard
from that applicable to a similar provision in the federal Constitution, there must be
"cogent reasons" for doing so. Id. at 51 (citing Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077
(Cal. 1990) (quoting Gabrielli v. Knickerbocker, 82 P.2d 391 (Cal. 1938))).
111. 605 A.2d 63 (Me. 1992).
112. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17A, § 1111-A (West 1983 & Supp. 1991).
113. The plaintiff was also the sole member of the New World Church, and as
such had appointed himself "medicine pipe registrar." Rupert, 605 A.2d at 65. In that
capacity the plaintiff had registered his marijuana pipe as a "medicine pipe." Id. The
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that under one of its recent decisions, the state must show a
"compelling public interest" to justify burdens upon sincerely
held religious beliefs.' The court noted the development of
Smith, but held that "[w]e have no reason in this case to decide
whether we in applying the Maine Free Exercise Clause will
change course to follow the Supreme Court's lead in Smith.""5
The court justified its avoidance of Smith by finding that the
state had a compelling interest in preventing the distribution
and use of illegal drugs, including marijuana."6
Not all such cases have been reluctant to apply Smith. For
example, the Ohio Court of Appeals was faced with a case fac-
tually similar to the Rupert case in State v. Flesher."' In
Flesher, the defendant was pulled over by a police officer who
noticed a partially burned marijuana cigarette in the car's ash-
tray. The police officer searched the car and found a bag of
marijuana seeds, an unused marijuana cigarette and other
partially burned marijuana . cigarettes."' The defendant
claimed that he used marijuana solely for religious purposes,
and analogized his case to People v. Woody,"' the famous pre-
Smith California Supreme Court decision upholding the right of
members of the Native American Church to use peyote in their
religious ceremonies. However, the court looked at the recent
decision in Smith, and in a one-sentence holding denied the
relief sought: "[t]he Smith case therefore reduces appellant's
arguments to a puff of smoke."'
plaintiff held a Master of Divinity degree from Harvard University. While at Harvard,
the plaintiff had written a thesis on the historical use of hallucinogenic mushrooms in
Indian religion. Id. Among other things, the plaintiff claimed to have been a graduate
of the United States Air Force Academy and a former United States Air Force officer,
as well as a graduate of the Georgetown University Law Center. Id. at 65 n.2.
114. Rupert, 605 A.2d at 65-66 (citing Blount v. Department of Educ. & Cultural
Servs., 551 A.2d 1377 (Me. 1988)).
115. Id. at 66 n.3.
116. Id. at 66.
117. 585 N.E.2d 901 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990).
118. Id. at 902.
119. 394 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1964).
120. Flesher, 585 N.E.2d at 903.
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2. A Legislative Return to "Compelling Interest"
In response to the Smith opinion, a movement was undertak-
en in Congress to replace the Smith standard with the "old"
compelling interest standard. 1 The proposed bills explicitly
stated that "in Employment Division of Oregon v. Smith the
Supreme Court virtually eliminated the requirement that the
government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by
laws neutral toward religion."2 The bills then stated that
"the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner
and Wisconsin v. Yoder is a workable test" 3 and that the
"Government may burden a person's exercise of religion only if
it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person (1)
is essential to further a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest." 4  In introducing the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1992 to the Senate, Senator Kenne-
dy stated:
America was founded as a land of religious freedom and a
haven from religious persecution. Two centuries later, that
founding principle is suddenly in danger. Religious liberty is
damaged each day the Smith decision stands. Since Smith,
more than 50 cases have been decided against religious
claimants, and harmful rulings are likely to continue."
121. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1991, H.R. 2797, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1991); Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1992, S. 2969, 102d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1992); see Michael Hirsley, Churches Battle for Return to Past, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 9,
1991, at 9; Ruth Marcus, Reins on Religious Freedom?; Broad Coalition Protests Im-
pact of High Court Ruling, WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 1991, at Al; Stephen J. Solarz, The
Court's Erosion of Religious Freedom, NEWSDAY, Aug. 23, 1990, at 71.
In addition to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Senator Inouye (D-HI)
introduced an amendment to the American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978 on
January 14, 1991. The amendment does not specify the test by which free exercise
cases should be decided, but mentions the narrowing of free exercise rights of Native
Americans by the United States Supreme Court. The Bill would require many pro-
cedural safeguards for Native American religious organizations, and appears to be a
response primarily to the Court's opinion in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Pro-
tective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988). See 137 CONG. REC. 5763 (daily ed. January 14,
1991).
122. H.R. 2797, § 2(a)(4); S. 2969, § 2(a)(4).
123. H.R. 2797, § 2(a)(5); S. 2969, § 2(a)(5).
124. H.R. 2797, § 3(b); S. 2969, § 3(b).
125. 138 CONG. REC. S9821-22 (daily ed. July 2, 1992) (statement of Sen. Kenne-
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The Religious Freedom Restoration Acts of 1991 and 1992
were met by a "counter-bill" called the Religious Freedom Act of
1991.12' This bill was introduced on November 26, 1991 by
Representatiire Christopher H. Smith (R-N.J.). The bill essen-
tially mirrored the provisions of the Religious Freedom Resto-
ration Acts of 1991 and 1992, replacing the Smith test with the
"compelling interest" test, but also went a step further. The
Religious Freedom Act of 1991 contains a provision that spe-
cifically prevents use of the legislation to secure a right to an
abortion or abortion funding.2 1 In addition to the abortion is-
sue, the drafters of the bill were concerned about the tax status
of religious organizations. 28
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1991 proved more
popular in the House than its counterpart, the Religious Free-
dom Act of 1991.129 The Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA) won passage on November 15, 1993.13° The new law
has the effect of requiring the compelling interest test to be
applied to all free exercise cases. As discussed earlier, however,
the Smith decision did not change the analysis that would be
applied in a foster care context. Consequently, the seesaw be-
tween applicable standards provided by Smith and the RFRA
dy). Senator Kennedy also stated that the Bill had the support of numerous religious
groups, including the American Civil Liberties Union, the American Jewish Commit-
tee, the Baptist Joint Committee, the Christian Legal Society, the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints, Coalitions for America, Concerned Women for America,
the Episcopal Church, the Home School Legal Defense Association, the National Asso-
ciation of Evangelicals, the National Council of Churches, People for the American
Way, and the Southern Baptist Convention. Id.
126. H.R. 4040, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
127. Representative Smith stated that the ACLU and the Religious Coalition For
Abortion Rights were using free exercise of religion claims to attack "pro-life" laws in
Utah, Guam, Louisiana, Michigan, and New York. See 137 CoNG. REC. E4186-87
(daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991) (remarks of Rep. Smith).
128. Id. at E4187.
129. See Carol Emert, Apostle Asks Senate Panel To Support Religious Freedom
Bill, STATES NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 18, 1992; Carol Emert, Lawmakers Debate Religious
Freedom Bill, STATES NEWS SERVICE, May 14, 1992; Carol Emert, Mormon Elder Ad-
dresses Congressional Panel Head, Urges Support For Religious Freedom Bill, STATES
NEWS SERVICE, May 13, 1992; Robert P. Hey, Religious Freedom Legislation Could
Snag on Abortion Controversy, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 1, 1991, at 8; Larry
Witham, Abortion Clouds Bill on Religion, WASH. TIMEs, Mar. 2, 1992, at A6.
130. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993).
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should have little ultimate impact upon consideration of religion
as a factor in foster care placements. In the next section, this
article argues that the participants in the foster care system
have a compelling interest in having their religious beliefs con-
sidered during the placement process.
III. CONFLICTING CONSTITUTIONAL INTERESTS
Foster care in the United States is an attempt by the states
to protect and care for children whose natural parents are oth-
erwise unable to do so.'' The overriding concern in placing a
child into a foster care home is what is in the best interest of
the child.1"2 This concern can only be adequately addressed
when a consideration for the child's religious background is
taken into consideration.
133
Approximately seventy percent of all children in foster care
systems are placed in private homes with a family. 34 For for-
ty percent of the children in foster care, a return to the natural
131. See STANFORD N. KATZ, WHEN PARENTS FAIL, THE LAW'S RESPONSE TO FAMI-
LY BREAKDOWN 93-95 (1971).
132. LYNN D. WARDLE ET AL., 2 CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW § 11.08 (1988). Other
standards are sometimes used. For example, some courts will look for "changed cir-
cumstances." VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5532 (1991); In re Certain Neglected Children,
349 A.2d 228, 229 (Vt. 1975) (citing Gokey v. Gokey, 248 A.2d 738, 739 (1968)). An-
other example is "the child will not be endangered [by the specific harms that justi-
fied removal] if returned home." INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION & THE AMER-
ICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT, STANDARDS RELATING
TO ABUSE AND NEGLECT § 7.5 (1977). Finally, some courts use a test that determines
whether "returning custody to the parent would . . . be detrimental to the child." In
re Audrey D., 160 Cal. Rptr. 802, 805 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that the parent
seeking the return of the child has the burden of proving that such action will not be
detrimental to the best interests of the child). See also sources cited infra note 144.
133. Early foster care systems in the United States were formed with the actual
promotion of religion in mind, and agencies conducted religious meetings for the chil-
dren. SUSAN TIFFIN, IN WHOSE BEST INTEREST? 88 (1982). In fact, one of the goals of
systems such as the New York Children's Aid Society in the latter half of the 19th
century was to place Catholic children in Protestant homes precisely to strip them of
their religious beliefs. Id. at 91. Although this intent is no longer present, the effect
may remain, without any opportunity for the child or his or her parent to affect the
outcome of the situation.
134. See WARDLE, supra note 132, at § 11.06; (citing Child Welfare Statistical
Notes No. 1 at 4 (December, 1983)). Further, the population of children in foster care
has grown by nearly 50 percent since 1985, to 407,000 in 1990. Larry Rohter, To
Save or End a Troubled Parent's Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1992, §4.
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family is the ultimate goal,13 and the state seeks to minimize
the disruption in the child's life by placement with a similar
family. Forty-nine percent of all foster care children do
ultimately return to their natural family.'36 In fifty percent of
the cases, a child will remain in foster care for three years or
more.' After a child has been in foster care for three years
or more, the chances of leaving the system are greatly
diminished. 8'
These statistics indicate that although foster care is consid-
ered to be a temporary transfer of custody from the parents, it
often is not.3 9 In addition, foster care placement will have a
deep and lasting effect upon the child.'40 Because most foster
care children will be in foster homes at a time in which their
religious beliefs are formed, foster care will often have a pro-
found impact upon those beliefs.' Thus, it would be desirable
to place children into homes where their expressed religious
beliefs would be nurtured."
135. See WARDLE, supra note 132 at, § 11.06.
136. Id.
137. Id. at § 11.06 n.9 (citing Michael S. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of
'Neglected" Children: Standards for Removal of Children from Their Homes, Monitor.
ing the Status of Children in Foster Care, and Termination of Parental Rights, 28
STAN. L. REv. 623, 626-27 (1976)).
138. Wardle, supra note 132, at § 11.06 (citing FOSTER CHILDREN IN THE COURTS
360 (Mark Hardin ed., 1983)). In 1987, only 800 of the 29,000 foster children in New
York City were adopted. Ilene Barth, The Key to Halting Child Abuse: All of Us,
NEwsDAY, Jan. 1, 1989, at 9.
139. See Mark Hardin, Legal Placement Options to Achieve Permanence for Chil-
dren in Foster Care, in FOSTER CHILDREN IN THE COURTS (Mark Hardin ed., 1983).
Even in situations where the child will not be in foster care for any significant
length of time, researchers agree that one of the key elements in the healthy devel-
opment of a child is stability. See sources cited infra notes 144-48. Therefore, the
foster care system should seek to limit the amount of disruption in the child's life,
and place the child in a home as much like the child's "natural home" as possible.
140. See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
(1973).
141. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60 n.51 (1985) (citing Illinois ex rel.
McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 227 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring);
Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 290 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring);
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983)); see also Edwards v. Aguillard, 482
U.S. 578, 584-85 (1987); Gregory A. Horowitz, Note, Accommodation and Neutrality
Under the Establishment Clause: The Foster Care Challenge, 98 YALE L.J. 617, 621
(1989).
142. The trial court in the Zummo case found that "Judaism and Catholicism are
irreconcilable; and, exposure to both religions might 'unfairly confuse and disorient
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In today's society, however, it is not always possible to
achieve the most desirable placements. Nevertheless, from a
legal standpoint, 'the issue of what the state must do to protect
the rights of the parties involved arises.' Leo Pfeffer identi-
fied three parties with an interest in the consideration of reli-
gion when considering child custody issues.'45 The interest is
shared among the parents, the child, and the community, ac-
cording to Pfeffer. 48 But to say that these parties have an in-
terest in how or where a child is placed, does not answer the
question of who has a right to direct how or where a child is
placed.
the children, and perhaps vitiate all benefits flowing from either religion.'" Zummo v.
Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1142 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (quoting Zummo v. Zummo, 121
Montg.Co.L.R. at 253-56 (1988)).
143. Most courts and statutes impacting child custody issues provide that the most
important consideration is the "best interest of the child." ALA. CODE § 12-15-71
(1992); ALAsKA STAT. §25.20.060 (1992); ARI. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-108 (1992); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 9-9-220 (Michie 1992); CAL. WELF. & INST. § 16520 (West 1993); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 19-1-115 (1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-56 (1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
13, § 722 (1992); FLA. STAT. ch. 61.13 (1993); HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-46 (1992); IDA-
HO CODE § 32-717 (1992); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, parn. 602 (1992); IND. CODE ANN. §
31-1-11.5-21 (Bums 1992); IOWA CODE § 598.41 (1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1563
(1991); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.510 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1992); LA. CH. CODE ACT
1255 (West 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4036 (West 1992); MD. CODE ANN.,
FA. LAW § 5-312 (1992); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 208, § 31 (Law. Co-op. 1992); MICH.
CoMiP. LAws § 710.39 (1991); MINN. STAT. § 257.025 (1992); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-5-
24 (1991); Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.375 (1991); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-212 (1992);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-364 (1991); NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.480 (1991); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 169-C:23 (1991); N.J. REV. STAT. § 9:2-4 (1992); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9
(Michie 1992); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 115-b (Consol. 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2
(1992); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-22 (1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04 (Baldwin
1992); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 21.1 (1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.137 (1991); 23 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 5303 (1992); R.I. GEN. LAWs § 15-5-16 (1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 25-5-10 (1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-166 (1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-
10 (1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 665 (1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-278.15 (Michie
1992); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.100 (1991); WIS. STAT. § 767.24 (1990); Mock v.
Mock, 369 S.E.2d 255 (Ga. 1988); Moore v. Moore, 386 S.E.2d 456 (S.C. 1989);
Mormanis v. Mormanis, 296 S.E.2d 680 (W. Va. 1982).
144. For example, the Supreme Court has held that a parent's right to affect the
religious upbringing of the child may not be disturbed absent a showing of a "sub-
stantial threat" of "physical or mental harm to the child, or to the public safety,
peace, order, or welfare." Zummo, 574 A.2d at 1138 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 230 (1972)).
145. Leo Pfeffer, Religion in the Upbringing of Children, 35 B.U. L. REV. 333, 338-
39 (1955).
146. Id.; see also Andrew J. Kleinfeld, The Balance of Power Among Infants, their
Parents and the State, 4 FAT 1. L.Q. 319 (1970).
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A. A Child's Right to Affect his or her Religious Upbringing
Until recently, the right of a child to affect his or her own
religious upbringing has not been recognized. Throughout the
history of the United States, the ability to be raised in a cer-
tain religion was considered to be a privilege.'47 Although
privilege did not amount to right, the courts went overboard to
ensure that this "privilege" was satisfied. In Pereira v.
Pereira," a Massachusetts court said: "I find that no one, not
even the parents, have the right to deny an immature child
who has been baptized a Roman Catholic, the privilege of being
reared in Catholicity."" Although it seems that the court is
recognizing and protecting a right of the child, what the courts
were actually doing during this time period was protecting the
religion. This results in the subordination of the individual to
the religion. For example, in In re Mancini,5 ° an adult broth-
er petitioned for the custody of his fourteen-year-old sister, who
was currently living with a Protestant minister. The brother
was Catholic. The sister opposed the petition, and the judge
held that although he did not wish to disregard the child's
wishes, "I will not forget that the religious status of the child
before me is that of a Catholic child."'5'
Later, some courts began to consider that the child may have
a right to affect its religious upbringing. A New York court held
it was an error to place Catholic children for adoption in a
Jewish social agency where an authorized Catholic agency was
willing to assume custody for the children:
147. In fact, the First Amendment to the Constitution, which provides protection
for religious freedoms, was adopted during an "era of extreme religious bigotry and
persecution." Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1133 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). For a
discussion of the founding of protection of religious liberties, see Zummo, 574 A.2d at
1333. Although the nation was born in bigotry, the Court has recognized that today
the Constitution is interpreted to protect "the infidel, the atheist, or the adherent of
a non-Christian faith such as Islam or Judaism." Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52
(1985) (footnote omitted).
148. No. D-16741 (Probate Court, Bristol County, Mass. 1954).
149. Id.
150. 151 N.Y.S. 387 (1915).
151. Id. at 388 (emphasis added).
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It was and still is practicable to give these infants to an
institution under the control of persons of their religious
faith in fulfillment of the statute that their "religious faith
shall be preserved and protected by the Court." To this the
children have a natural and legal right of which they can-
not be deprived by their temporary exposure to the culture
of another religion prior to the age of reason.152
Until the 1980s, however, it was doubtful whether a child actu-
ally had a legal right to affect his or her own religious
upbringing.
153
Although the Supreme Court has not yet conclusively decided
that children retain the right to affect their own religious up-
bringing, several recent cases at least allude to some protection.
For example, in Westside Community Schools v. Mergens, the
Court upheld the right of high school students to form a
"Christian Club" that utilized school facilities.'54 Mergens was
based upon an alleged violation of the Equal Access Act,'55
which provides that schools may not deny organizations equal
access to their facilities on the basis of religion.'56 The issue,
as framed by the Court, was one of statutory construction, and
whether the student group fit within the statute's concept of a
protected organization. The Court clearly did not hold that
children have a protected constitutional right to free exercise of
religion. Nevertheless, Mergens indicates that it is understood
152. In re Santos, 105 N.Y.S.2d 716, appeal dismissed, 304 N.Y. 483 (1952).
153. Pfeffer, supra note 145, at 339. "When [the court] speaks of the child's
'privilege' or 'natural right' to its religious faith or states that the child is 'entitled to
be raised' in a particular faith, it is using theological terminology and entering into
the field of theology or, more realistically, misdesignating the child as beneficiary of
legal protection being accorded either to its parent or to the particular church." Id.
(footnote omitted).
This was also mentioned by Justice Douglas in his dissent in Wisconsin v.
Yoder, where he criticized the majority for considering the child's right to free exer-
cise as being derived from the parents' right. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 243
(1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
154. 496 U.S. 226 (1990). Significantly, the Court was not required to address the
free exercise issue. The action was based upon the Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. §§
4071-4074 (1988), and therefore the Court simply based its decision upon that Act.
The Court did engage in a lengthy discussion of the establishment clause conflict.
155. 20 U.S.C. §§ 40714074 (1988).
156. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(a). The Act applies to public secondary schools receiving
federal funding and having a "limited open forum." Id.
1993]
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by the Court and by the legislature that children do hold
religious beliefs, and these beliefs are worthy of some
consideration.
Despite granting that these beliefs are worthy of some protec-
tion, the Court has avoided stating that these beliefs are wor-
thy of constitutional protection. For example, in Committee for
Public Education v. Nyquist,'57 the Court was faced with a
challenge to the state of New York's policy of granting public
funds for the "maintenance" of private schools and tuition reim-
bursement programs for parents who sent their children to
those schools. The policy was challenged on Establishment
Clause grounds, and one of the defenses of the state was that
the policy was necessary to protect the right to free exer-
cise.'58 The state argued that parents had a constitutional
right to have their children educated in sectarian schools. The
state did not argue, nor did the Court mention, however, that
the children themselves had a right to freely exercise their
religion, and that such a right might include the availability of
religious education.'59
Perhaps the greatest recognition of a child's right to free
exercise is found in yet another Establishment Clause case,
Wisconsin v. Yoder.6 ' In this famous case involving the right
of the Amish to decline to send their children to public high
schools, Justice Douglas penned a dissent that criticized the
Court for considering only what the Amish parents wanted, and
failing to consider what the Amish children might want. 6'
The majority found that the right of the Amish children to reli-
gious freedom was not presented. Douglas took issue with this,
stating that "[a]lthough the lower courts and a majority of this
Court assume an identity of interest between parent and child,
it is clear that they have treated the religious interest of the
child as a factor in the analysis."'62 Douglas believed that
157. 413 U.s. 756 (1973).
158. Id. at 788.
159. See Pfeffer, supra note 145, at 338-39; infra text accompanying note 162.
160. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
161. Id. at 241 (Douglas, J., dissenting). This distinction is important because it
recognizes the child's right as independent of, rather than derived from, the right of
the parent.
162. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 242.
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religion was an individual issue, and that the appeal presented
the issue of "children's religious liberty."'
Justice Douglas reviewed previous cases involving protected
constitutional rights of children such as Haley v. Ohio,' In re
Gault,'65 In re Winship,'66 Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District,"7 and West Virginia State Board
of Education v. Barnette.6 ' He concluded from these cases
that "children themselves have constitutionally protectible inter-
ests" as they are "persons' within the meaning of the Bill of
Rights."'69 The majority avoided a discussion of this issue by
holding that it was not before them.
As Justice Douglas noted, the Supreme Court on several
occasions has held children to be "persons" entitled to the pro-
tections of the Bill of Rights. For example, in the case of Haley
v. Ohio,"' the Court held that the protections of the Four-
teenth Amendment were available to a fifteen-year-old. A simi-
lar result was reached in In re Gault."' There, the Court
stated "neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of
Rights is for adults alone."'72 The protection of the Sixth
Amendment was subsequently held to cover a twelve-year-old in
In re Winship. 3 Haley, Gault, and Winship provided proce-
dural protections to children. But the application of the Bill of
Rights to children by the Supreme Court has not been limited
solely to procedural protections. These cases developed from
earlier cases such as Pierce v. Society of Sisters"4 and Prince
v. Massachusetts,"5 which dealt with constitutionally protected
parental rights that were substantive, rather than procedural.
163. Id. at 243.
164. 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
165. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
166. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
167. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
168. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
169. Yoder, 406 U.S at 243.
170. 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
171. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
172. Id. at 13.
173. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
174. 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (recognizing the right of the child to a religious educa-
tion).
175. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
1993]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dis-
trict,176 the Court found that students between the ages of
thirteen and sixteen had First Amendment rights, and that
those rights had been impinged when they were disciplined for
wearing armbands in school. The Court stated: "Students in
school as well as out of school are 'persons' under our Consti-
tution. They are possessed of fundamental rights which the
State must respect, just as they themselves must respect their
obligations to the State."'77 Here the Court explicitly expands
the scope of protection from procedural, to substantive free
speech rights. In doing so, the Court very plainly states that
children are "persons" entitled to the protections of the
Constitution.
Finally, in West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette,"' the Court implied that children have a protected
right to free exercise of religion under the Constitution. In
Barnette, students and their parents claimed that a school rule
requiring the students to salute the American flag violated
their religious beliefs. The Court agreed, and stated: "we are
dealing with a compulsion of students to declare a belief."79
However, the Court did not say that children have a right to
free exercise. In fact, it is possible that the Court was holding
that the rights of the parents had been violated, and the
children held those rights derivatively.' Justice Douglas, in
his Yoder dissent, however, did not think so. He stated: "While
the sanction included expulsion of the students and prosecution
176. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
177. Id. at 511.
178. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
179. Id. at 631.
180. In a later case, Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), the Court ini-
tially seemed to give credence to the conclusion that Barnette had held that children
hold a protected right to exercise their religion. The Court said in Prince: "The rights
of children to [freely] exercise their religion . . . have had recognition here, most
recently in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette." Id. at 165 (citation
omitted). But the Court later hedged on this saying, "[it is true children have rights,
in common with older people, . . . " (Id. at 169), but "[the state's authority over
children's activities is broader than over like actions of adults." Id. at 168. Thus,
what Prince may be trying to say is that constitutional protection exists for a child's
free exercise of religion, but not to the same degree as for adults. The difficulty is
that the Court never articulates how the child's right is to be measured, whether it
be by the "strict scrutiny" or "compelling interest" test, or some other lower standard.
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of the parents, the vice of the regime was its interference with
the child's free exercise of religion."'8'
Regardless of whether the Court in 1943 intended to hold
that children have a constitutionally protected right to freely
exercise their religion, or whether the Court felt that right was
derived from the parent's right, the Court has since held that
children themselves are entitled to the protection of the Bill of
Rights. If the provisions of the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment, the Sixth Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment all apply to protect children, then the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment should provide similar
preservation.
A child's placement in a foster home should not affect his or
her constitutionally protected religious upbringing.182 The diffi-
culty lies in deciding at what point the child's interest actually
becomes a protected right.'83 In In re Glavas,8 4 the court
questioned whether a child under the age of seven could compe-
tently declare a religious affiliation. The child did not hold a
protectable right until "he, himself, is in the position to deter-
mine what religion he desires to follow providing, always, that
ethical concepts and life in response to such concepts are in-
culcated and instilled in the child."85
In In re Santos, on the other hand, when placing two sisters,
aged seven and eight, the court took into consideration "the
religion of the girls themselves as evidenced by the finding of
their Jewishness, to be weighed in any estimate of the psycho-
181. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 244 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (em-
phasis added) (citation omitted).
182. See Arneth v. Gross, 699 F. Supp. 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that minors
residing under foster care in a Roman Catholic mission fall outside of the mission's
religious activity, and the minors have a right to use contraception privately even
though the use of birth control violates church doctrine).
183. See Paul Ramsey, The Legal Imputation of Religion To An Infant in Adoption
Proceedings, 34 N.Y.U. L. REv. 649 (1959). "Any finding as to 'the faith of a child,'
which is not entirely derived from parental choice of religion, must be based on con-
siderations of the child's capacity and awareness, since the court may not without
using its own unrealized prejudices know what reality or truth there may be in the
asserted objective transmission of religion to a child by other means." Id. at 664.
184. 121 N.Y.S.2d 12 (1953).
185. Id. at 13-14.
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logical and other factors in their best interests. [Aind, possibly,
a finding as to the girls' subjective allegiances."" 6 But to what
extent can a child hold a "subjective allegiance?"'87 And how
would a court determine when such an allegiance was present?
In the Zummo case,. the trial court determined that three,
four, and eight year old children had asserted personal religious
affiliations that were entitled to protection.'88 This was re-
versed on appeal.'89 The Pennsylvania Superior Court found
that:
Though no uniform age of discretion is set, children twelve
or older are generally considered mature enough to assert a
religious identity, while children eight and under are not.
With those ranges as a starting point, judges exercise broad
discretion on a case by case basis in determining whether a
child has sufficient capacity to assert for itself a personal
religious identity.9 '
The court also noted that in Zucco v. Garrett, an Illinois Ap-
peals Court held that unless there is some evidence of a child's
personal preferences, the question of sufficient maturity does
186. Ramsey, supra note 183, at 672 (discussing In re Santos, 105 N.Y.S.2d 716
(1951), appeal dismissed, 109 N.E.2d 71 (1952)); see Zummo v. Zummo 574 A.2d 1130,
1148-50 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
187. See Harold S. Kushner, WHEN CHILDREN ASK ABOUT GOD 25-35 (1971); Ray-
mond G. Carey, Influences of Peers in Shaping Religious Behavior, 10 J. FOR THE SCI.
STUDY OF RELIGION 157 (1971); Cynthia A. Clark et al., The Transmission of Reli-
gious Beliefs and Practices from Parents to Firstborn Early Adolescent Sons, 50 J. OF
MARRIAGE & THE FAM. 463 (1988); Marie Cornwall, The Social Bases of Religion: A
Study of Factors Influencing Religious Belief and Commitment, 29 REv. OF RELIGIOUS
RES. 44, 50 (1987); Roger L. Dudley & Margaret G. Dudley, Transmission of Religious
Values from Parents to Adolescents, 28 REv. OF RELIGIOUS RES. 3 (1986); Dean R.
Hoge et al., Transmission of Religious and Social Values from Parents to Teenage
Children, 44 J. OF MARRIAGE & THE FAM. 569 (1982); Bruce Hunsberger, Parent-Uni-
versity Student Agreement on Religious and Nonreligious Issues, 24 J. FOR THE SCI.
STUDY OF RELIGION 314 (1985); Dianne K. Kieren & Brenda Munro, Following the
Leaders: Parents' Influence on Adolescent Religious Activity, 26 J. FOR THE SCI. STUDY
OF RELIGION 249 (1987); Ian McAllister, Religious Change and Secularization: The
Transmission of Religious Values in Australia, 49 Soc. ANALYSIS 249 (1988); Raymond
H. Potvin & Che-Fu Lee, Adolescent Religion: A Developmental Approach, 43 Soc.
ANALYSIS 131 (1982).
188. Zummo, 574 A.2d at 1148.
189. Id. at 1149-50.
190. Id. at 1149.
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not arise.19' In Zummo, the children had expressed no rights,
and therefore the court felt that it did not need to decide the
issue.'92
Nevertheless, the court's observation about judicial determi-
nations of a child's religion was reasonable. Without trying to
squeeze such determinations into a rigid and mechanical test,
the court set forth age guidelines for judges to use as a starting
point. From there the judge may apply the facts and circum-
stances of the case in front of him or her, and determine whe-
ther the child is sufficiently mature to have an interest in de-
termining his or her own religion that is protected by the First
Amendment. Furthermore, the judge may decide, when neces-
sary, whether the child's belief and affiliation are sufficiently
developed to override the preference of a parent. The requisite
standard to be applied when the right is sought to be en-
croached upon by the state will be considered later in this
article.
93
B. The Parents' Right to Direct the Child's Religious
Upbringing
In any situation where the custody of a child changes, wheth-
er it be a divorce proceeding, adoption, or foster care, two indi-
viduals or sets of parents are involved. The parties include the
relinquishing (usually natural) parent or parents, and the as-
suming (usually adoptive or foster) parent or parents. Each side
of the transaction possesses valuable free exercise rights that
may be impacted by the State."M
1. Relinquishing or Natural Parents
It is undisputed that parents have a constitutional right to
direct the religious education and upbringing of their
191. Id. (citing Zucco v. Garrett, 501 N.E.2d 875, 880 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)).
192. Id. at 1149-50.
193. See infra notes 233-302 and accompanying text.
194. See generally JOSEPH R. CARRIERI, Rights of Natural Parents, in THE FOSTER
CHILD 1989: FROM ABANDONMENT TO ADOPTION 185 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice
Course Handbook Series No. 151, 1989).
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children.'95 In a case immediately preceding the Smith de-
cision, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania noted that "lt]he
United States Supreme Court has specifically held that parental
authority in matters of religious upbringing may be encroached
upon, only upon a showing of a 'substantial threat' of 'physical
or mental harm to the child, or to the public safety, peace,
order, or welfare.""96
This holding arose from decisions such as Prince v. Massa-
chusetts'97 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters,' which held that
parents had protected First Amendment rights to affect the
religious development of their children. In Prince, a Jehovah's
Witness was convicted of a violation of child labor laws for
allowing her nine-year-old daughter to proselytize. The mother
appealed, claiming that the law prevented her from freely exer-
cising her religion by preventing her from passing her faith on
to her niece. 9 The Court recognized the right of the parent
to affect the child's religious upbringing, citing Pierce and Meyer
v. Nebraska.0 0 Nevertheless, it found that the State's interest
in protecting children was sufficient to outweigh the parental
right, and upheld the statute.0'
Pierce and Meyer firmly established the right of parents to
direct their children's religious development. Meyer was the
earlier of the two, and set up the basic foundation for
Pierce-that parents and guardians have a protected liberty
interest in directing the upbringing and education of the chil-
dren under their control."2  In Meyer, the United States
Supreme Court considered a Nebraska statute that prevented
teaching German in public schools. The Court found that
195. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 230 (1972) (holding that parents' direction
of religious upbringing may only be encroached upon by a showing of substantial
threat to the "physical or mental health of the child or to the public safety, peace,
order or welfare"); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
196. Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1138 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (quoting Wis-
consin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 230 (1972)).
197. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
198. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
199. In addition to being the legal guardian of her niece, Mrs. Prince had two
minor sons. Her sons engaged in proselytization as well. Prince, 321 U.S. at 161.
200. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
201. Prince, 321 U.S. at 169-70.
202. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 390.
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Nebraska's statute unconstitutionally compromised the parents'
liberty.
203
Although Meyer initially promulgated the notion that parents
have a protected interest in directing the upbringing of their
children, Pierce "stands as a charter of the rights of parents to
direct the religious upbringing of their children."20 4 The plain-
tiffs in Pierce challenged an Oregon statute that required chil-
dren to attend public school. The Court found the statute un-
constitutional, writing:
Under the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, we
think it entirely plain that the Act of 1922 unreasonably
interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to di-
rect the upbringing and education of children under their
control. As often heretofore pointed out, rights guaranteed
by the Constitution may not be abridged by legislation
which has no reasonable relation to some purpose within
the competency of the State. The fundamental theory of
liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose
excludes a general power of the State to standardize its
children by forcing them to accept instruction from public
teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the
State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have
the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and
prepare him for additional obligations.0 5
As a result of the Meyer and Pierce line of cases, "[t]his
primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children
is now established beyond debate as an enduring American
tradition.""8
The right to direct the spiritual and religious development of
the child does not disappear simply because a parent releases
custody of the child.20 7 In Santosky v. Kramer, the Court held
203. Id. at 403.
204. State v. Whisner, 351 N.E.2d 750, 770 (Ohio 1976) (quoting Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972)).
205. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
206. Whisner, 351 N.E.2d at 769 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232
(1972)).
207. "The vast majority of courts addressing this issue . . . have concluded that
each parent must be free to provide religious exposure and instruction, as that parent
1993]
90 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:53
that "[tihe fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in
the care, custody, and management of their child does not evap-
orate simply because they have not been model parents.""'
On the other hand, the natural parents' rights are not
absolute."9 For example, many cases have held that a parent
may not deny a child necessary medical treatment on religious
grounds.210 Similarly, a state cannot be "expected to duplicate
the standard of religious practice in the parents' home or satis-
fy the parents' every request with respect to the children's reli-
gious instruction."21" ' Nevertheless, an attempt should be made
to accommodate a parent's reasonable religious preferences in a
foster care placement." 2
2. Prospective Foster Parents
In addition to the rights of the natural parents, prospective
foster care parents have free exercise rights that are impacted
sees fit, during any and all period of legal custody . . .unless the challenged beliefs
or conduct of the parent are demonstrated to present a substantial threat of present
or future, physical or emotional harm to the child in absence of the proposed restric-
tion." Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1154-55 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
A parent voluntarily placing a child into a foster home does not relinquish
"legal" custody. MARK HARDIN, Setting Limits on Voluntary Foster Care, in FOSTER
CHILDREN IN THE CoURTS (Mark Hardin ed., 1983); JOSEPH R. CARRIERI, The Ways
The Foster Child Comes Into Foster Care, in THE FOSTER CHILD 1989: FROM ABAN-
DONMENT TO ADOPTION (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No.
151, 1989). But see Marsha Garrison, Why Terminate Parental Rights?, 35 STAN. L.
REV. 423, 427 n.22 (1983).
208. 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982); see also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651-52
(1972); Jordan C. Paul, "You Get the House. I get the Car. You Get the Kids. I Get
Their Souls." The Impact of Spiritual Custody Awards on the Free Exercise Rights of
Parents, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 583 (1989).
209. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233-34 (1972); see also Prince v. Massachu-
setts, 321 U.S. 158, 165-67 (1944); Duro v. District Attorney, 712 F.2d 96, 99 (4th
Cir. 1983) (holding state's interest in compulsory education limited parental rights).
210. Hermanson v. State, 570 So.2d 322 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); see Jehovah's
Witnesses v. King County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488, 504 (W.D. Wash. 1967) (three
judge panel), affd, 390 U.S. 598 (1968) (per curiam); see also Paula A. Monopoli,
Allocating the Costs of Parental Free Exercise: Striking A New Balance Between Sin-
cere Religious Belief and a Child's Right to Medical Treatment, 18 PEPP. L. REv. 319
(1991).
211. Pfoltzer v. County of Fairfax, 775 F. Supp. 874, 885 (E.D. Va. 1991) (citing
Wilder v. Bernstein, 848 F.2d 1338 (2d Cir. 1988)).
212. See id. (quoting Wilder, 848 F.2d at 1346-47).
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by the system. In Orzechowski v. Perales,"1' the Roman Catho-
lic Orzechowskis attempted to assume custody of a Jewish child
who was physically handicapped.214 Although the placement
agency, the Foundling Hospital, found the Orzechowskis to be
"caring, concerned individuals who are ready to provide a loving
home for a child," they denied the application based upon the
Orzechowskis' religion.215 The hospital had found in the Orze-
chowskis a loving and caring couple who were qualified to take
care of a disabled child who had spent her entire life in a hos-
pital. However, the hospital denied them the opportunity to
adopt the child, notwithstanding the Orzechowskis' plans to
raise the child in the Jewish faith with the help of a rabbi.
The Orzechowskis sued, claiming, among other things, that
their right to free exercise was being infringed. They argued
that the application of religious matching provisions inhibited
the free exercise of their religion because they were told they
could not "continue to practice their religion and adopt a child
whose biological parents were Jewish.""6 The New York
County Supreme Court stated that an infringement upon free
exercise must be "substantial" before it is actionable." 7 The
court found that "[i]t cannot be said that there is substantial
pressure on the Orzechowskis to modify their religious
beliefs."2"' As a result, their free exercise claim was
dismissed.219
The Orzechowski case is important for two reasons. First, it
indicates that although potential adoptive parents (and foster
parents) have a free exercise right to adopt children of a differ-
ent faith, that right is subordinate to the wishes of the natural
parent. Second, the case indicates the extremes to which some
213. 582 N.Y.S.2d 341 (1992).
214. The little girl, Nelli, was four years old and suffered congenital disabilities
including club feet, dislocated hips and a missing leg socket. She also suffered from
Goltz Syndrome, a condition causing fatty lesions on the face and body. Nelli was
also afflicted with spina bifida and required daily catheterizations. Id. at 343.
215. Id. at 344 (quoting Plaintiffs Complaint at paragraph 40).
216. Id. at 348 (quoting Plaintiffs Opposition Brief at 24).
217. Id. (citing Thomas v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Div., 450 U.S.
707, 717-18 (1981)).
218. Id.
219. Id.
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courts will go to fulfill the desires of the natural parents with
regard to the religious upbringing of the child. Orzechowski can
be criticized on this second point, as the overriding concern
should be the best interest of the child. In the Orzechowski
case, there can hardly be doubt that the best interests of that
child called for placement with the Orzechowskis, even though
they were not Jewish. A reasonable attempt to locate a Jewish
family had been made, and none were available. The family
that was available had offered to raise the child in the Jewish
faith with the assistance of a rabbi. The court's denial of place-
ment gives too rigid a consideration of the natural parents'
rights.
3. Conflicting Religious Beliefs Between Parents
One of the most perplexing problems facing courts making
custody determinations is the resolution of conflicts between the
natural mother's religious beliefs and the natural father's reli-
gious beliefs.22 ° There are no cases discussing this issue in
either a foster care or adoption setting, but it has been ana-
lyzed in a marital dissolution context.22' This issue merits
brief discussion, as it may foreseeably arise in foster care deter-
minations if the relinquishing parents disagree about the reli-
gious preference for the assuming parents.
220. The Supreme Court of North Dakota remarked that "[flew areas of dispute in
child custody and visitation cases are more fraught with difficulty than those involv-
ing differences in the religious beliefs of the divorced parents." Hanson v. Hanson,
404 N.W.2d 460, 463 (N.D. 1987). The Washington Supreme Court noted that "inter-
vention in matters of religion is a perilous adventure upon which the judiciary should
be loath to embark." Munoz v. Munoz, 489 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Wash. 1971) (citing
Donahue v. Donahue, 142 N.J. Eq. 701 (E. & A. 1948)); see also Wojnarowicz v. Woj-
narowicz, 137 A.2d 618, 621 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1958); LeDoux v. LeDoux, 452 N.W.2d
1, 7 (Neb. 1990) (Shanahan, J., dissenting).
221. See, e.g., Clift v. Clift, 346 So.2d 429, 435 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977); In re Mar-
riage of Urband, 137 Cal. Rptr. 433 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977); Goodman v. Goodman, 141
N.W.2d 445, 448 (Neb. 1966); Commonwealth ex rel. Ackerman v. Ackerman, 205 A-2d
49, 51-52 (Pa. Super. 1964); In re Marriage of Hadeen, 619 P.2d 374, 382 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1980); see also Jay Copp, Program Helps Faith of Kids of Divorce, THE NEW
WORLD, July 19, 1991; Rosalie Duron, We Don't Want To See You Anymore, LIBERTY,
SeptJOct. 1991, at 16; Daniel J. Lehmann, DePaul Tries New Tactics On Interfaith
Divorce Woes, CHI. SUN-TIMES, June 16, 1991, at 16; Pilot Project Relates to Religious
Child Custody, UNITED CHURCH NEWS, Nov. 1991, at 16; Mitchell A. Tyner, Who Gets
the Kid?, LIBERTY, May/June 1991, at 8.
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In Kirchner v. Caughey,"22 the Court of Appeals of Maryland
vacated an order entered by the lower court that prohibited a
non-custodial father from taking his daughter, Bridgette, to
church. The mother and father were divorced and practiced
different religious faiths. At the time Bridgette was born, her
mother was Lutheran and her father Catholic. Bridgette was
baptized in the Catholic faith but attended Lutheran services as
a child. After the divorce, the father left the Catholic church
and converted to the Methodist religion. In 1989, the father
once again changed churches, this time to become a fundamen-
talist Baptist.
223
Bridgette's mother told the trial court that Bridgette began to
show signs of anxiety in late 1989. Bridgette was returning
home from visits with her father in tears and having trouble
sleeping. She believed these problems stemmed from certain of
the father's religious activities and the "ardor" with which he
pursued his fundamentalist beliefs. She asked the father not to
take Bridgette with him to church, but he refused. At that
point, the mother filed a petition seeking to enjoin the father
from taking Bridgette to church.' After two days of testimo-
ny, the specially appointed master concluded, "by compelling
the minor child to participate in his religious practices the
father is harming the child and that such harm is, in fact,
detrimental to her well-being-and that it is not in the best in-
terest of the child to participate in the father's religious
practices."2
5
The father took exceptions to this order, which were denied.
On appeal, the court stated, "courts that have considered custo-
dy or visitation disputes involving the religious practices of the
parents have generally required a clear showing that a parent's
religious practices have been or are likely to be harmful to the
child before allowing judicial interference with those religious
practices." 6 The Maryland Court of Appeals held that the
222. 606 A.2d 257 (Md. Ct. App. 1992).
223. Id. at 260.
224. Id. at 259.
225. Id. at 261.
226. Id. at 261-62 (citing In re Marriage of Murga, 163 Cal. Rptr. 79, 82 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1980); Compton v. Gilmore, 560 P.2d 861, 863 (Idaho 1977); Osier v. Osier, 410
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record below demonstrated only the mother's conclusions and
speculations that the father's religious activity had harmed the
child. This was insufficient, as the father's constitutional rights
could not be limited by the mere "general testimony of a parent
that the child is 'confused' or 'upset' by conflicting religious
practices."227
The court recognized that there may be some value in letting
the child see the different religious attitudes and beliefs and
that diversity is a "sound stimulant for a child."22 The court
cautioned, however, that the child should not be harmed by
such diversity. Thus, "careful attention is needed to resolve the
delicate question of what is in the best interest of this child
with respect to attendance at the father's church." 9 The
court remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to
consider the type and method of judicial intervention required.
Courts have been cautioned that when there is sufficient
need to intervene, the action should be that "which intrudes
least on the religious inclinations of either parent and is yet
compatible with the health of the child."' 0 Further, the reme-
dy should be "narrowly tailor[ed] . . . so as to result in the
least possible intrusion upon the constitutionally protected in-
terests of the parent.""'
If the relinquishing parents are of different faiths, foster care
placement agencies should consider whether families are avail-
able of either faith. Of course, other factors will also play a role
in any placement decision. Because religion will not be the
A.2d 1027, 1030 (Me. 1980); Felton v. Felton, 418 N.E.2d 606, 607-08 (Mass. 1981);
Pope v. Pope, 267 S.W.2d 340, 343 (Mo. Ct. App. 1954); LeDoux v. LeDoux, 452
N.W.2d 1, 5 (Neb. 1990); Khlasa v. Khlasa, 751 P.2d 715, 719-21 (N.M. Ct. App.
1988); Hanson v. Hanson, 404 N.W.2d 460, 463-64 (N.D. 1987); Zummo v. Zummo,
574 A.2d 1130, 1140-41 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990); Robertson v. Robertson, 575 P.2d 1092,
1093 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978); Munoz v. Munoz, 489 P.2d 1133, 1135-36 (Wash. 1971);
Developments in the Law: The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156,
1338-40 (1980); Annotation, Religion As A Factor In Child Custody and Visitation
Cases, 22 A.L.R.4th 971, 1020-28 (1983)).
227. Kirchner, 606 A.2d at 262 (citing Khlasa, 751 P.2d at 720); accord Felton, 418
N.E.2d at 610; Hanson, 404 N.W.2d at 464; Robertson, 575 P.2d at 1093.
228. Kirchner, 606 A.2d at 263.
229. Id.
230. Felton, 418 N.E.2d at 608.
231. LeDoux v. LeDoux, 452 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Neb. 1990).
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foremost consideration, the likelihood of a conflict is reduced.
For example, where there is a Catholic father and a Jewish
mother and only a Catholic home is available, the child should
probably be placed in the Catholic home. In that situation, the
foremost consideration is getting the child out of the custody of
the state and into a family environment. Religion is a second-
ary consideration, but it is still a factor. It is preferable to
place the child in an available Catholic home, as opposed to an
available Baptist home.
The most difficult situation for a court will be where two
homes of equal value are available; that is, the father is Catho-
lic and the mother is Jewish, and both Catholic and Jewish
homes are available. In making placement decisions in such a
case, agencies would be wise to seek some type of mediation
program to resolve the problem. 2
C. The State's Interests
So far this article has considered the interests of three sepa-
rate parties: the foster child, the natural parents, and the foster
parents. There is yet another party with an interest in this
puzzle, however. Most foster care and adoption programs are
either managed by, or at least funded by, some state agen-
cy-" Thus, the state has an interest in how and where foster
care children are placed.
Perhaps more importantly, the state has an interest in pro-
tecting the welfare of its minor citizensY4 This interest is of-
232. See Jay Copp, Program Helps Faith of Kids of Divorce, THE NEW WORLD,
July 19, 1991; Daniel J. Lehmann, DePaul Tries New Tactics On Interfaith Divorce,
Woes, Cm. SuN-TIMES, June 16, 1991, at 16; Pilot Project Relates to Religious Child
Custody, UNITED CHURCH NEWS, Nov. 1991, at 16.
233. See 2 HOMER H. CLARK JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNIT-
ED STATES § 21.8, at 648 (2d ed. 1987).
234. See New York Foundling Hosp. v. Gatti, 203 U.S. 429, 439-40 (1906); see also
Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 263 (1984) (state's interest as parens patriae makes a
juvenile criminal proceeding different from that of an adult); Santosky v. Kramer, 455
U.S. 745, 766-67 (1982) (state's interest as parens patriae is in preserving and pro-
moting the welfare of the child); In re Heather B., 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 891, 901 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1992) (citing Santosky, 455 U.S. at 766-67); In re Eugene W., 105 Cal. Rptr.
736, 740 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972) (state as parens patriae has a duty to act in the best
interest of the child); In re Alexander V., 613 A.2d 780, 785 (Conn. 1992) (state as
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ten referred to as "parens patriae.""5
The state's duty as parens patriae arose in ancient civiliza-
tions such as Greece, Egypt, and Persia. 6 The Greek state
took charge of the children in its society and educated them
according to the will of the state. 37 Conversely, under early
English common law, the parent was given absolute control of
the child, subject to the power of the king, in the interest of
the child as well as in the interest of the state." s Justice
Field wrote in Insurance Co. v. Bangs.9 that the doctrine of
parens patriae arose as a right and duty of the English Crown,
and that this right was delegated to the court of chancery."
This delegation of the "right of the Crown" is now assumed
more frequently by state courts than by federal courts, and
therefore it is the individual state that is "in the situation of
parens patriae." 4
Unlike the police power, the State parens patriae power
literally meaning "parent of the country," is a limited power
of the State to act as guardian to persons with legal dis-
abilities, such as infants and mental incompetents who lack
the capacity to protect their own best interests. The modem
concept of parens patriae is subject to three limitations.
parens patriae is interested in accurate and speedy resolution of litigation).
235. Parens patriae literally means the father or parent of the country. In re Fe-
male S., 444 N.Y.S.2d 829, 831 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1981). Black's Law Dictionary defines
"parens patriae" as "the principle that the state must care for those who cannot take
care of themselves .... " BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1991).
236. See Lippincott v. Lippincott, 97 N.J. Eq. 517, 519 (E. & A. 1925). For other
detailed discussions of the history of the development of the concept of parens patri-
ae, see Weber v. Doust, 146 P. 623 (Wash. 1915) and In re Hudson, 126 P.2d 765
(Wash. 1942).
237. In re Baby 'M," 525 A.2d 1128, 1133 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1987).
238. Lippincott, 97 N.J. Eq. at 520.
239. 103 U.S. 435 (1881).
240. Id. at 438. There is some debate over whether the power and duty of parens
patriae is held by the legislature or the courts. See Franklin v. New Jersey Dep't of
Human Services, 543 A.2d 56, 69 n.13 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988) ("[A]ccording
to our system of government, the power of parens patriae belongs exclusively to the
legislature of each state, and is not possessed by the courts.") (quoting 4 POMEROY'S
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1304, at 870 n.14 (5th ed. 1941)). As a matter of fact, how-
ever, both courts and legislatures claim the duty to act as parens patriae. See, e.g.,
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-502 (1992); In re Baby "M," 525 A.2d 1128, 1132 (N.J.
Super. Ct. 1987).
241. Bangs, 103 U.S. at 438.
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First, exercise of parens patriae power is presumed to apply
only to those "dependent" children who lack the mental
competence of adults. Second, before the State acts, the
federal due process clause requires the State to demonstrate
that, by clear and convincing evidence, exercise of its power
is necessary because the child's parent or custodian is unfit.
Third and finally, State exercise of this power must attempt
to further the best interest of the child.242
The doctrine of parens patriae requires the state to consider
the child's best interests as paramount."4s  However, the
breadth of this doctrine is debatable.2' On the one hand, the
state's duty as parens patriae may be said to protect children
from "injury and injustice, from harmful employment and envi-
ronment, and from abuse in all forms."" This definition could
be construed fairly liberally. "[T]he legislature may and should
make reasonable regulations tending toward the protection and
welfare of the child; and so important is this governmental
function that the limitations of the Constitution are to be so
construed, if possible, as not to interfere with its legitimate
exercise." " The state's power is not, however, unlimited.
242. In re Thompson, 502 N.E.2d 916, 921 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (citing Devel-
opments in the Law, The Constitution, and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156, 1201
(1980); See Douglas R. Rendleman, Parens Patriae: From Chancery to Juvenile Court,
23 S.C. L. REV. 205, 219 (1971); Gilbert T. Venable, Note, The Parens Patriae Theory
and Its Effect on the Constitutional Limits of Juvenile Court Powers, 27 U. PITT. L.
REV. 894, 905 (1966)).
243. In re Cooper, 631 P.2d 632, 637 (Kan. 1981) (citations omitted); see also In re
Female S., 444 N.Y.S.2d 829, 831 (N.Y. Faro. Ct. 1981) ("Overlapping the court's role
as parens patriae is the key principle of 'best interests of the child.'). It has been
suggested that parens patriae."contemplates not only a right, but also a duty, on the
part of the State, to act for the protection of the individual and then only in his or
her best interests." Brian J. Linn & Lesly A. Bowers, The Historical Fallacies Behind
Legal Prohibitions of Marriages Involving Mentally Retarded Persons-The Eternal
Child Grows Up, 13 GONZAGA L. REV. 625, 638 (1978).
244. The doctrine has been criticized, but usually only when it operates to deny a
minor the right to due process of law. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967)
("e Latin phrase proved to be a great help to those who sought to rationalize the
exclusion of juveniles from the constitutional scheme; but its meaning is murky and
its historic credentials are of dubious relevance."); West Virginia ex rel. Harris v.
Calendine, 233 S.E.2d 318 (W. Va. 1977) (holding that parens patriae has been sus-
pect from earliest times); see also Kleinfeld, supra note 146.
245. Kansas ex rel. O'Sullivan v. Heart Ministries, Inc., 607 P.2d 1102, 1109 (Kan.
1980).
246. 43 C.J.S. Infants § 5 (1978). See Rodarte v. Cox, 828 S.W.2d 65, 79 (Tex. Ct.
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In Brock v. District Court of County of Boulder,"4 the
Supreme Court of Colorado held that "[t]he exercise of parens
patriae jurisdiction should be limited to those cases where there
is substantial evidence of a grave emergency affecting the im-
mediate welfare of the child."2 8
A Maryland court stated in In re Adoption No. 2428" 9 that
"[als parens patriae, the State's goal is to provide the child with
a permanent home.""0 In Cornhusker Christian Children's
Home, Inc. v. Department of Social Services,"' a Nebraska
court found that society also had a "paramount" interest in
seeing that children are loved and cared for, including moral
training and educationY2
The issue thus comes down to whether the state's "parens
patriae" interest supersedes the parental constitutional
rightsY3 In In re William L.,254 a Pennsylvania court found
that although parental rights were to be accorded significant
protection, the State, acting as parens patriae, could constitu-
tionally subordinate the parental rights to protect the child's
essential health and safety needs.
But does the state's power include the right to place a child
in a foster care home that is of a faith inconsistent with the
faith in which the natural parent wishes the child to be raised?
Or for that matter, may the state place the child in a foster
care home of a faith inconsistent with the child's own beliefs?
The State may claim at least three distinct interests that justi-
fy the exercise of its parens patriae power to subordinate the
interests of the parents, and, if the issue presents itself, those
of the child.
App. 1991); see also 67A C.J.S. Parent & Child § 52 (1978); 42 AM. JUR. 2D Infants
§§ 14, 15 (1969).
247. 620 P.2d 11 (Colo. 1980).
248. Id. at 14.
249. 567 A.2d 139 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989).
250. Id. at 146; see also In re Enrique R., 494 N.Y.S.2d 800, 801 (N.Y. Faro. Ct.
1985) (recognizing that the state's goal is to provide permanent home).
251. 416 N.W.2d 551 (Neb. 1987).
252. Id. at 561.
253. See, e.g., In re Cross, Nos. 89-033, 89-034, 1991 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2350, at
*10-11 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 27, 1991).
254. 383 A.2d 1228 (Pa. 1978).
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First, the child's best interests require placement in private
homes as quickly as possible; considering the religious prefer-
ences of children and/or their parents will result in delays that
are not in the child's best interest. Second, if religion is a factor
in making placements, children of more popular faiths will be
placed more rapidly and in "better" homes than foster care chil-
dren of less popular faiths. Finally, the State may have a legiti-
mate concern to avoid a conflict with the Establishment Clause.
The following subsections consider these three state interests.
1. Quick Placement
In a typical foster care scheme, children who are abandoned
or who are removed from the care and custody of their natural
parents are placed into the care and custody of either a state or
private institution.255  The quality of the institutions
varies." They can range from being virtual dungeons-in
which children are paid scant attention and are under minimal
supervision, facing recurring disease, violence, and other
abuse-to clean and bright accommodations where the children
are well cared for and educated. 7 Regardless of where a par-
ticular institution falls on this scale, placing a child with a
foster care family is better.u8 Child' psychologists have argued
that children need the stable environment of a family to proper-
ly develop, a need that goes unfulfilled while the child remains
in the custody of the state. Thus, the quick placement of
255. See THEODORE J. STEIN, CHILD WELFARE AND THE LAW 18 (1991). Of the fifty
states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and Guam, 36 sys-
tems are state administered and 18 are state supervised. Id. at n.19 (citing U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CHARACTERISTICS OF STATE PLANS FOR AID
TO FAMILIES WITH DEPENDENT CHILDREN 2 (1983)).
256. See Michael B. Mushlin, Unsafe Havens: The Case for Constitutional Protection
of Foster Children From Abuse and Neglect, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 199 (1988).
257. Stacey L. Arthur, The Norplant Prescription: Birth Control, Woman Control, or
Crime Control?, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1, 78 (1992) (citing Richard P. Barth & Marianne
Berry, Child Abuse and Child Welfare Services, in CONDITIONS OF CHILDREN IN CAL-
iFORNIA 227, 236-37 (1989)).
258. MARK HARDIN & ANN SHALLECK, COURT RULEs To ACHIEVE PEIMAENCY FOR
FOSTER CHILDREN: SAMiPLE RULES AND COMMENTARY 10 (1985); Leon A. Rosenberg,
Psychological Factors in Separation and Reunification: The Needs of the Child and of
the Family, 12 CHILDREN'S LEGAL RTs. J. 19 (1991).
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children into private homes is a significant factor in foster care
placement." 9
States may feel that consideration of religion will result in
delay that is detrimental to the child, since consideration of
religion will require time spent with the child, each natural
parent, and each potential foster care parent to determine the
compatibility of their faiths.
Religion, however, need not be an all-encompassing factor
decisive in every placement. The children and parents have the
right to have religion considered as one of several important
factors.26  In the end, quick placement may be in an
individual child's best interest, regardless of the fact that the
placement is not "in-religion." On the other hand, if two homes
are simultaneously available for an Orthodox Jewish child, and
one home is Orthodox Jewish and the other home is Catholic,
why not take the child's religion into consideration and place
the child in the Jewish home?
Quick placement may not be the greatest concern for some
children. For example, a child who faces physical disabilities
may require placement with a family that is equipped to deal
with those disabilities."1 Certainly a disabled child should not
be placed with the very first family that becomes available sim-
ply because it is better for the child to be placed quickly rather
than anything else.26 However, if the state takes into con-
sideration other factors that may cause delay, such as physical
disability, age, gender, race,26 and proximity to natural fami-
259. See Jim Bencivenga, Experts Assess Laws, Costs in Fight Against Child Abuse,
CHRISTIAN Sci. MONITOR, Sept. 29, 1983, at 3.
260. See Orzechowski v. Perales, 582 N.Y.S.2d 341, 347 (1992).
261. See id. at 343.
262. The converse of this is the denial of placement on the basis of parental pref-
erence, as in Orzechowski. Id. The "best interests" standard in Orzechowski should
have led that court to deny the stated parental preference for a Jewish home.
263. The issue of whether a state may constitutionally consider a child's race as a
factor in foster care placements has been widely discussed. See, e.g., Elizabeth Barth-
olet, Where Do Black Children Belong? The Politics of Race Matching In Adoption,
139 U. PA. L. REV. 1163 (1991); James S. Bowen, Cultural Convergences and Diver-
gences: The Nexus Between Putative Afro-America Family Values and the Best Interests
of the Child, 26 J. FAM. L. 487 (1987-88); Angela T. McCormick, Transracial Adop.
tion: A Critical View of the Courts' Present Standards, 28 J. FAM. L. 303 (1989-90).
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ly, then the state is admitting that quick placement is not the
overriding concern in every placement. Failure to consider reli-
gion under these circumstances is therefore inexcusable and
unconstitutional."
2. Avoiding Discrimination
A state may fail to consider a child's or parent's religious
preferences to avoid discrimination.265 If, for example, there
are three Catholic homes for every Jewish home and ten Jewish
homes for every Sikh home in any given community, and
religion is considered as a factor in every placement, then Cath-
olic children are far more likely than Sikh or Jewish children to
(i) be placed quickly, and (ii) be placed in a home of a consis-
tent faith. By considering religion as a factor in the placement
process, children of Jewish and Sikh faiths are being deprived
of the benefits accorded Catholic children solely on the basis of
their religion. By refusing to consider religion as a factor in the
placement process, the state avoids the potential for
discrimination.
This problem can be avoided by using a placement system
that allows the individual child or parent to have the option of
eliminating the consideration of religion as a factor in the pro-
cess.- Therefore, if the child is Jewish and does not wish to
potentially delay placement by waiting for a Jewish home, the
child may choose to be placed on a first-come-first-served basis.
This shifts the onus of the potential discriminatory effect aris-
ing from the disproportionate number of available non-Jewish
homes from the state to the individual.
3. Avoiding Establishment Clause Conflict
An issue related to the additional time necessary to consider
religion as a factor in foster care placements is the state's
264. See infra notes 303-24 and accompanying text. If a statute (or state policy)
contains a system of individualized exemptions, under Smith, the "compelling interest"
test applies when the challenger can show a burden to the free exercise of religion.
Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883-84 (1990).
265. See Wilder v. Sugarman, 385 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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concern about avoiding an Establishment Clause conflict."'
States may be concerned about whether they are advancing
religion or becoming excessively entangled with religion if they
consider religion as a factor in the placement process.267
For many years, the United States Supreme Court has decid-
ed such issues by application of the three-part test articulated
in Lemon v. Kurtzman."' To be constitutional, a statute or
practice must meet the following requirements: '"First, the stat-
ute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its princi-
pal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor
inhibits religion ... ; finally, the statute must not foster 'an ex-
cessive government entanglement with religion.' 269 This test
has been applied consistently over the years, but with inconsis-
tent results.'
Thus, as of today, it is constitutional for a state to hire a
Presbyterian minister to lead the legislature in daily
prayer,21' but unconstitutional for a state to set aside a
moment of silence in the schools for children to pray if they
want to. 2 It is unconstitutional for a state to require em-
ployers to accommodate their employees' work schedules to
their sabbath observances, 273 but constitutionally mandato-
ry for a state to require employers to pay workers compen-
sation when the resulting inconsistency between work and
sabbath leads to discharge 4.2 1 It is constitutional for the
government to give money to religiously affiliated organi-
zations to teach adolescents about proper sexual
266. The Establishment Clause provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Establishment Clause was
made applicable to the states in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
For a criticism of incorporation, see William Y. Lietzau, Rediscovering the Establish-
ment Clause: Federalism and the Rollback of Incorporation, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1191
(1990).
267. See Wilder v. Bernstein, 645 F. Supp. 1292, 1332 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
268. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
269. Id. at 612-13 (citations omitted).
270. See generally LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISI-IENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND
THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1986).
271. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
272. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
273. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
274. Frazee v. Employment Sec. Dep't, 489 U.S. 829 (1989); Hobbie v. Unemploy-
ment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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behavior,"5 but not to teach them science or history."
It is constitutional for the government to provide religious
school pupils with books,277 but not with maps;278 with
bus rides to religious schools, 279 but not from school to a
museum on a field trip;"0 with cash to pay for state man-
dated standardized tests,2' but not to pay for safety-relat-
ed maintenance. 2 It is a mess.2
This "mess" has generated criticism of the test by members of
the current Court.' The commentators have taken a similar
view of Lemon. 5
275. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
276. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 618-19 (1971).
277. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 238 (1968).
278. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 249-51 (1977).
279. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17 (1947).
280. Wolman, 433 U.S. at 252-55.
281. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 653-54 (1980).
282. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 774-80 (1973).
283. McConnell, Crossroads, supra note 2, at 119-20. As Professor McConnell has
vividly illustrated, the Lemon test allowed the Warren and Burger Courts to reach
just about any result they wished in any given case. Id. at 119.
284. Justice O'Connor has been most outspoken in this regard. In Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984), she stated: "It has never been entirely clear ... how
the three parts of the [Lemon] test relate to the principles enshrined in the Estab-
lishment Clause." Id. at 688-89 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also Aguilar v. Felton,
473 U.S. 402, 429-30 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (expressing "doubts about the
entanglement test").
The majority in Lynch found a nativity scene in a public location constitutional-
ly acceptable because the display also included candy-striped poles, a Christmas tree,
carolers, an elephant, a teddy bear, a clown, and a talking wishing well. Lawyers
have dubbed the holding in Lynch "the three plastic animals rule." McConnell, Cross-
roads, supra note 2, at 127. In County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 617-18
(1989), the Court applied the "three plastic animals rule" to a forty-five foot tall
Christmas tree. In that case, the county's display of a menorah was challenged, but
was found constitutional because of the tree.
Other Justices have criticized the Lemon test as well. See, e.g., County of Alle-
gheny, 492 U.S. at 656 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Sub-
stantial revision of our Establishment Clause doctrine may be in order ... ."); Ed-
wards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[Plessimistic
evaluation ... of the totality of Lemon is particularly applicable to the 'purpose'
prong ... ."); Wallace v. Jafree, 472 U.S. 38, 112 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(describing the Lemon test as "a constitutional theory [that] has no basis in the his-
tory of the amendment it seeks to interpret, is difficult to apply and yields unprin-
cipled results"); Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 768 (1976) (White, J.,
concurring) ("I am no more reconciled now to Lemon than I was when it was decid-
ed .... The threefold test of Lemon imposes unnecessary, and ... superfluous tests
for establishing [an Establishment Clause violation].").
285. Professor McConnell states "[tihe much discussed 'tension' between the two
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The Supreme Court recently had an opportunity to replace
the Lemon test in Lee v. Weisman. 8 The Weisman case
involved a challenge to a public high school's practice of having
prayers offered at graduation ceremonies." The Court found
that the prayers were unconstitutional, but avoided replacing
the Lemon test. Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority,
stated that the graduation prayers failed to meet the "mini-
mum- ... [c]onstitution[al] guarantee that government may
not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its
exercise, or otherwise act in a way which 'establishes a [state]
religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.'"2  Because the
practice failed to satisfy the stricter "coercion!' analysis, there
was no reason to reevaluate the Lemon framework, thus Lemon
continued unmolestedY. 9
Although the Court in Weisman discussed the case in terms
of coercion, and did not apply the Lemon test, Lemon was not
discarded. On the other hand, the "substantial effort to avoid
reliance on Lemon suggests that the Court may be willing to
allow the coercion test to coexist with, or supplant entirely, the
Lemon framework."2 9 Accordingly, the article will analyze
Religion Clauses largely arises from the Court's substitution of a misleading formula
[the Lemon test] . . . and subsidiary, instrumental, values (especially the separation
of church and state) in place of the central value of religious liberty." Michael W.
McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 1-2; see also Michael
W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV.
933, 936-41 (1986); David E. Steinberg, Alternatives to Entanglement, 80 KY. L.J. 691,
691-92 (1992).
286. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
287. The prayers were given by a rabbi, who was instructed to give nonsectarian
prayers. Weisman v. Lee, 728 F. Supp. 68, 69 (D.R.I. 1990).
288. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2649 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678
(1984)).
289. See id. Justice Scalia referred to the majority opinion as a "lamentable deci-
sion" and a 'jurisprudential disaster." Id. at 2685 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia wrote
that the most important question in Establishment Clause analysis was the role of
history and tradition. Justice Scalia felt that because high school graduation prayers
were a long-held and important tradition in this country, they should be held con-
stitutional. Id. at 2679. He criticized the majority for creating a "boundless, and
boundlessly manipulable, test of psychological coercion 5.3(b)(iii) . . . ." Id. Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist and Justices White and Thomas joined Scalia's dissenting opinion.
Despite Justice Scalia's "lamentations," the Lemon test has survived Weisman
and remains the measure of constitutionality for Establishment Clause issues as of
this writing.
290. The Supreme Court, 1991 Term; Leading Cases, 106 HARV. L. REV. 163, 264
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whether a state must consider religion as a factor in foster care
placements under both the Lemon test and the "coercion" test.
i. Secular Legislative Purpose
A statute that requires states to consider religion as a factor
in the placement process would fulfill the state's duty as parens
patriae to do what is in the child's best interest."' Doing
what is in the child's best interest is a secular purpose and
may require placement in a foster home of compatible religious
belief. Purists might argue that to do what is in the child's best
religious interest is still a religious purpose; however, such an
argument confuses purpose with effect. As Justice O'Connor has
commented: "It is disingenuous to look for a purely secular pur-
pose when the manifest objective of a statute is to facilitate the
free exercise of religion by lifting a government-imposed
burden."92
Nevertheless, it is not likely that a state will pass a statute
that requires agencies to consider religion as a factor. It is
more likely that a challenge will arise as to a practice or policy:
either challenging the practice of considering religion, on Estab-
lishment Clause grounds, or the practice of not considering
religion, on free exercise grounds. Thus, the first prong of the
Lemon test is not likely to be a factor in a foster care context.
ii. Principal or Primary Effect
It has long been recognized that a state cannot avoid all
contact with religion. 3 As a result, the Supreme Court has
promulgated a policy of state "neutrality"'294  toward reli-
gion. 5 The state may feel that by considering religion in the
(1992).
291. See Note, The Establishment Clause and Religion in Child Custody Disputes:
Factoring Religion into the Best Interest Equation, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1702 (1984).
292. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 83 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
293. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952); see also LEVY, supra note 270,
at 121-22; cf. Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 382 (1985); Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1983); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971).
294. See supra notes 52-65 and accompanying text.
295. See, e.g., Ball, 473 U.S. at 382; Wallace, 472 U.S. at 60; Committee for Pub.
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placement process, the state would be advancing religion by
causing children to feel that they should have a religion. Never-
theless, a state need not be concerned that it will be accused of
"advancing" religion by merely allowing it to be considered as a
factor in foster care placements." Furthermore, the flip side
of "advancing" religion is that by failing to consider religion, a
state could just as easily be accused of "inhibiting religion."'
As Professor McConnell has observed,
[Tihe effects prong fails to distinguish between advancing
religion and advancing religious freedom. Any advancement
of religious freedom is an advancement of religion-but not
vice versa .... By failing to distinguish between these two
forms of [b] "advancement," the effects prong of the Lemon
test interferes with benign government actions to accommo-
date or facilitate free religious exercise."
The consideration of religion as a factor in foster care place-
ments is an advancement of religious freedom, which should be
permissible under Establishment Clause analysis,"99 and not
an advancement of religious dogma, which the Establishment
Clause was designed to prevent."'
Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 792-93 (1973); Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970); School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 215 (1963); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
296. It has been said that the Establishment Clause requires what the Free Exer-
cise Clause forbids. See McConnell, Crossroads, supra note 2, at 118.
297. Indeed, that is the thesis of this article. This article has been written in a
"free exercise" rather than an "establishment" framework. Nevertheless, it is arguable
that by failing to consider religion when placing foster children, the state inhibits
religion in violation of the establishment clause. Some may feel that the argument is
a wash; the state cannot consider religion without advancing or inhibiting religion.
This article suggests that when the state is faced with such a dilemma, it should
always favor the option that maximizes individual liberty.
298. McConnell, Crossroads, supra note 2, at 129.
299. See, e.g., Leo Pfeffer, The Unity of the First Amendment Religion Clauses, in
THE FIRST FREEDOM: RELIGION AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 133 (1990); Bette Novit
Evans, Contradictory Demands on the First Amendment Religion Clauses: Having It
Both Ways, 30 J. OF CHURCH AND STATE 463 (1988); Leo Pfeffer, Freedom and/or
Separation: The Constitutional Dilemma of the First Amendment, 64 MINN. L. REV.
561 (1980).
300. See Kurland, Origins, supra note 64.
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iii. Excessive Entanglement
To consider religion as a factor in foster care placements,
state agents, or private parties funded by the state, would be
required to make detailed inquiries into the faith of the child,
each of the natural parents, and each of the potential foster
care parents. Faiths may have many subsets or sects,30 1 pre-
venting simply "pigeonholing" children as Christian, Jewish, or
Muslim, for example. The state would need to delve deeply into
the religious consciences of all parties involved, and this could
result in such entanglement with religious issues that it would
violate the Establishment Clause.
However, a state need not become so entangled. The concern
is that children and their parents have the opportunity to have
religion considered as a factor in placements. An argument that
the state must find a home of the exact faith and character
desired would be ridiculous. The argument here is only that the
state must consider religion as one factor in the placement
process.
iv. Coercion
If the Lemon test is abandoned in favor of a coercion-based
test, challenges to the consideration of religion in a foster care
context based upon the Establishment Clause would be likely.
If an Establishment Clause challenge were made by a foster
child or his or her parents, the state could not defend its prac-
tice of refusing to consider religion as a factor on grounds that
allowing religion to be considered as a factor would "coerce"
parents or foster children to accept some religious doctrine. If
the practice were already in place, and the challenge was based
upon the Establishment Clause, the challenger would have to
argue that giving the opportunity to state a religious preference
was a coercion to state that preference.
301. JOHN C. ARCHER, FAITHS MEN LIVE BY (2d ed. rev. 1938).
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v. Reconciling the Clauses
Full discussion of this topic is beyond the scope of this
article.0 2 If, in the final analysis, the conflict between the
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses cannot be resolved,
the state should seek to protect individual liberty before collec-
tive liberty. Thus, if forced to choose between protecting the
individual right to freely exercise religion and the collective
right to avoid a state establishment of religion, a state would
be wise to protect the former at the expense of the latter.
IV. RELIGION SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS A FACTOR IN
MAKING PLACEMENTS
Thus far, this article has considered the seesaw of change in
the way the United States Supreme Court and Congress have
required free exercise cases to be decided and has identified the
interests of all parties involved in a foster care context. It re-
mains to be seen what states must do to protect the interests of
the parties involved. This section of the article begins with a
discussion of the well-known case of Wilder v. Bernstein,"3
which involved the constitutionality of a New York statute that
required the state to consider religion in making foster care
placements. The second subsection will discuss the Smith opin-
ion and the effect it could have had on consideration of free
exercise challenges in a. foster care context. It argues that a
state is confronted with a "hybrid" right when the issue of reli-
gion as a factor in foster care placements is raised-an amal-
gamation of the child's right to freely exercise his or her reli-
gion, and the parent's right to direct the upbringing of the
child. Thus, Smith would not have affected the test by which
the issue is analyzed. Rather, the state would still be required
to demonstrate an interest that rises to the level of "compel-
ling" before it would be allowed to burden the rights of foster
care children or their parents.
302. See Jesse H. Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconcil-
ing the Conflict, 41 U. PITT. L. REV. 673 (1980).
303. 965 F.2d 1196 (2d Cir. 1992).
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It is the fundamental premise of this article that Smith did
not change the method by Which the free exercise rights of
foster care children and their parents should be analyzed, and
that the RFRA will similarly leave the analysis untouched. It
remains to be seen, however, whether the state interests de-
scribed earlier may operate to vindicate a state's refusal to
consider religion in the placement process.
A. The Wilder Saga
The ongoing cases of Wilder v. Bernstein are an excellent
example of a piece of litigation that simply refuses to go
away."'4 The "case" began in 1973 with the decision of the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York in Wilder v. Sugarman.3 5 There the court considered the
issue of whether the New York foster care scheme, which took
religion into account as a factor in the placement process, vio-
lated the Establishment Clause.36 The court applied the Lem-
on test and determined that the New York religious matching
statute0 7 violated both the purpose and effects prongs.0 8
The purpose of the statute, according to the court, was to pro-
vide for religious training for foster care children in accordance
with the wishes of the parents, and this was not a secular pur-
pose.0 9 The court found that providing state funds for this
304. For a good overview of Wilder, see Martin Guggenheim, State-Supported Fos-
ter Care: The Interplay Between the Prohibition of Establishing Religion and the Free
Exercise Rights of Parents and Children: Wilder v. Bernstein, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 603
(1990).
305. 385 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (per curiam).
306. The earlier New York case of Dickens v. Ernesto was distinguished. 281
N.E.2d 153 (N.Y. 1972). Dickens involved a challenge to the state's practice of consid-
ering religion in adoption proceedings. Dickens upheld that practice, id. at 157, but
was distinguished in Wilder by the recognition that there was no state funding in-
volved in Dickens. Wilder, 385 F. Supp. at 1023.
307. The statute provided that placement "shall be made when practicable, to an
authorized agency under the control of persons of the same religious faith as that of
the child." N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 373(1) (McKinney 1983).
308. Wilder, 385 F. Supp. at 1023-24.
309. Id. at 1024. The Supreme Court would later rule that accommodation of free
exercise does not violate the "purpose" prong of the Lemon test. Corporation of the
Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987).
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purpose "directly support[s] the religion involved."310 The court
did not reach the issue of whether the statute violated the ex-
cessive entanglement prong of Lemon, although this issue would
arise in subsequent proceedings. 1'
In its analysis of the free exercise issues, the first Wilder
court found protected interests for both the parent and the
child.31 Thus, despite the Establishment Clause violation, the
statute and practice "represent[ed] ... a fair and reasonable
accommodation between the Establishment and Free Exercise
Clauses . . .""' Accordingly, the statute was held
constitutional.
In the fourth published opinion in the Wilder saga, the Sec-
ond Circuit rejected the claim that natural parents have the
right to have their child placed in a foster home with compati-
ble beliefs.314 The court did recognize that there was some pro-
tectible free exercise right, however. "So long as the state
makes reasonable efforts to assure that the religious needs of
the children are met during the interval in which the state
assumes parental responsibilities, the free exercise rights of the
parents and their children are adequately observed."315
What is most significant about the Wilder case, though, is
the recognition of a child's possession of free exercise rights. In
the first opinion, the court stated that the state has the duty
"of fulfilling the child's Free Exercise rights."16 The court was
criticized for its citation of cases in which the Supreme Court
actually held that a parent had the right to control the child's
310. Wilder, 385 F. Supp. at 1024.
311. The court considered excessive entanglement in Wilder v. Bernstein. 645 F.
Supp. 1292, 1331-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
312. Wilder, 385 F. Supp. at 1025-29.
313. Id. at 1029.
314. Wilder v. Bernstein, 848 F.2d 1338, 1347 (2d Cir. 1988). The second Wilder
opinion certified a plaintiff class to challenge the placement scheme. Wilder v. Bern-
stein, 499 F. Supp. 980 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). The third Wilder opinion approved a settle-
ment decree over objections. Wilder v. Bernstein, 645 F. Supp. 1292 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
The Second Circuit's opinion in 1988, the fourth published opinion in this case, af-
firmed the district court's approval of the settlement decree. The case survives to this
day, with the law firms and attorneys involved arguing about fees and other post-
trial matters. See, e.g., Wilder v. Bernstein, 965 F.2d 1196 (2d Cir. 1992).
315. Wilder, 848 F.2d at 1347.
316. Wilder, 385 F. Supp. at 1026.
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religious upbringing.317 Nevertheless, if the child is of suffi-
cient age to state a preference and the state or agency refuses
to consider it, "a free exercise suit would probably succeed."318
Professor Horowitz makes this statement based purely on the
child's right to freely exercise his or her religion.
The Wilder cases clearly emphasize and endorse the conclu-
sion of this article that a state, in attempting to do what is in
the best interest of a child, must consider religion as one of the
factors in making foster care placements. The competing con-
cerns raised in Wilder about the Establishment Clause were
found to be insufficient to support a denial of the opportunity
to have religion considered as a factor. The Wilder opinions
were all rendered prior to the Smith opinion, however.
B. The Impact of Smith on Free Exercise Analysis in Foster
Care
The courts in the Wilder opinions considered whether or not
the arguments against considering religion in foster care were
"compelling" enough to justify an order that the state refuse to
make such considerations. If this test were reduced-from "com-
pelling" or "strict scrutiny" to "mere rationality," as the Smith
opinion did for neutral laws of general applicability, the case
would likely be decided differently. It is certainly rational for
the state to refuse to consider religion as a factor in the process
in order to satisfy the legitimate concern of quick place-
ment.319 Similarly, it is rational to refuse consideration of reli-
gious preference to avoid the legitimate concerns about discrimi-
nation and the Establishment Clause.
The Smith opinion did not change the analysis of free exer-
cise issues in foster care placements, however, because of the
hybrid rights involved. As demonstrated earlier, there are sev-
eral parties who hold free exercise rights that are impacted by
a state's refusal to consider religion: the natural parents, 20
the foster parents32" ' and the foster child.322 The parents also
317. See supra notes 194-212 and accompanying text.
318. Horowitz, supra note 141, at 633.
319. One could argue that this is in fact not rational, as the best interest of the
child may require consideration of religion as a factor.
320. See supra notes 194-212 and accompanying text.
321. See supra notes 213-219 and accompanying text.
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have a right distinct from the free exercise right to direct the
religious upbringing of their children."s Justice Scalia used
this distinction as an example of a hybrid right within the
Smith opinion itself.32 Because of the hybrid nature of the
rights involved, the consideration of religion as a factor in fos-
ter care placement schemes under Smith would be analyzed
under the compelling interest test, just as it was when the
Wilder opinions were written. Smith, therefore, did not affect
the test by which this issue is analyzed. When Congress passed
the RFRA, then, the analysis remained unchanged. While much
relief is expressed over the passage of RFRA, those who are
members of the foster care community are unaffected.
V. CONCLUSION
Both foster care children and their parents have a fundamen-
tal right to exercise their religion freely. A state which refuses
to consider the religious preferences of either the parent or the
child burdens this right. Prior to 1990, states were required to
justify all burdens upon the free exercise rights of Americans
by proving a compelling interest. The Smith opinion changed
this test, allowing a state to burden an individual's right to
freely exercise religion with a neutral, generally applicable
statute that is rationally related to a legitimate state purpose
by the Smith rationale. Nevertheless, the foster care context
was unsullied. Because the foster care context presents a "hy-
brid" right and a system of individualized exemptions, the state
would still be required to prove a compelling interest before it
would be allowed to deny parents and their children the oppor-
tunity to have religion considered as a factor in making foster
care placements.
The RFRA returns the compelling interest test to free exer-
cise analysis. This legislation, however, like the Smith opinion
itself, does not affect the free exercise concerns of foster care
children nor their parents. Quite simply, the religious beliefs of
these people are too important to be ignored regardless of the
test applied.
322. See supra notes 147-193 and accompanying text.
323. See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
324. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990).
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